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1 成也萧何，败也萧何 (Cheng ye Xiao He, Bai ye Xiao He) is a Chinese idiom 
that can be literally translated as “raised up by Xiao He, cast down by Xiao He” 
and meaning “success and failure from the same cause”—something broadly akin 
to the English idiom “two sides of the same coin.”  The Chinese phrase refers to a 
tale from the late Qin/early Han dynasty in which Xiao He recommends Han 
Xin’s appointment as a general to the future founding emperor of the Han 
dynasty, only to later play a central role in Han Xin’s exposure, and downfall, as a 
rebel against the Han emperor. 
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A NOVEL VIRUS CHALLENGES A REFORMED 
REGULATORY SYSTEM 
Near the end of 2019, a novel coronavirus began to sicken 
residents of Wuhan, a city of more than 11 million and the capital of 
China’s Hubei province.2  The disease caused by the virus, which 
would soon be known as COVID-19, spread to other parts of China 
and abroad, prompting the World Health Organization (WHO) to 
declare a public health emergency of international concern on 
January 30, and a global pandemic on March 11, 2020.3  Despite a 
torrent of content on social media (especially WeChat), in Chinese 
and foreign media, and from government sources in China and 
elsewhere, there is as yet no fully authoritative account of the relevant 
actions and omissions at various levels and in multiple units of the 
Chinese system of governance.  A joint WHO-China mission’s nine-
day field visit to China in February 2020 offered a laudatory account 
of China’s response—one that drew serious and mounting skepticism, 
especially as information about early shortcomings in China’s 
response to the emergence of COVID-19 became known.4  Another 
 
2 Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html 
[https://perma.cc/U4KK-7BHK]; Archived: WHO Timeline—COVID-19, WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-
2020-who-timeline---covid-19 [https://perma.cc/36YQ-7XWA]. 
3 WHO Director-General’s Statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel 
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Jan. 30, 
2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-statement-
on-ihr-emergency-committee-on-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov) 
[https://perma.cc/7J87-5J9W]; WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the 
Media Briefing on COVID-19–11 March 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
[WHO] (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-
general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 
[https://perma.cc/96NA-9BWT]. 
4 Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-
19), WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Feb. 16–24, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-
on-covid-19-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L5R-6WH6]; François Godement, 
Fighting the Coronavirus Pandemic: China’s Influence at the World Health 
Organization, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/23/fighting-coronavirus-pandemic-china-
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WHO mission dispatched to China in July, 2020 to lay the 
groundwork for a months-long full investigation of the disease’s 
origin held out the possibility of providing additional answers, but 
any findings were sure to be controversial and disputed (in part due 
to concerns about limited access and charges of bias).5 
Although much, thus, remains to be learned, it is apparent that 
the handling of the outbreak in China reflects characteristic 
 
s-influence-at-world-health-organization-pub-81405 [https://perma.cc/J4YW-
VRGZ]; Emily Rauhala, World Health Organization: China Not Sharing Data on 
Coronavirus Infections among Health-Care Workers, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/world-health-
organization-china-not-sharing-data-on-health-care-worker-coronavirus-
infections/2020/02/26/28064fda-54e4-11ea-80ce-37a8d4266c09_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/3H2Y-DD4K].   
5 See WHO Experts Travel to China, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 
(July 7, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/07-07-2020-who-experts-
to-travel-to-china [https://perma.cc/CNR9-RDVZ] (describing an investigative 
mission undertaken by WHO experts); Emma Farge & Michael Shields, WHO 
Says China Team Interviewed Wuhan Scientists over Virus Origins, REUTERS 
(Aug. 4, 2020, 6:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-
who/who-says-china-team-interviewed-wuhan-scientists-over-virus-origins-
idUSKCN2501CE (reporting on interactions between Chinese officials, the 
WHO, and scientists in Wuhan); Javier C. Hernández & Amy Qin, China Uses 
W.H.O. Inquiry to Tout Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES  (Nov. 2, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/world/asia/china-coronavirus-who.html 
[https://perma.cc/JNV6-NPR7] (describing concerns about access and 
objectivity); Christian Shepherd et al., Failure by WHO Team to Visit Wuhan 
Sparks Concern over Virus Probe, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/f9dea077-66fb-4734-9d1d-076dc93568e1 (describing 
the impact of the WHO visit to Wuhan not occurring); Nick Paton Walsh, The 
Wuhan Files, CNN (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/30/asia/wuhan-
china-covid-
intl/index.html?utm_medium=social&utm_source=twCNN&utm_content=2020-
11-30T22:15:04 [https://perma.cc/3WGY-AWV2] (describing limited access of 
WHO mission to medical records and data, investigation team’s hope that “a trip 
to the field” would be permitted, and mounting international pressure on China to 
cooperate with “a World Health Organization inquiry into the origins of the 
virus”).   
Skepticism, in advance, toward the WHO’s mission was especially strong from 
the Trump administration.  See Remarks to the Press, Michael R. Pompeo, 
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of State, Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press 
Availability (July 15, 2020), https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-
at-a-press-availability-9 [https://perma.cc/KDC5-9Y6Y] (asserting that the WHO 
will “conduct what I am confident will be a completely, completely whitewashed 
investigation”). 
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weaknesses and strengths of the Chinese administrative state.  These 
attributes are shared, to some extent and to varying degrees, by other 
states, but China’s versions of these features are distinctive, and they 
appear to have affected its handling of the novel coronavirus 
pandemic.  China could undertake some reforms to reduce the risk 
that crises like COVID-19 will recur, but they will be difficult to 
adopt or implement. 
COVID-19 posed a serious test for a system that China had 
reformed to improve its handling of disease outbreaks after the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003.  The reforms 
had sought to:  avoid concealment of early indications of an outbreak 
by government officials and others; ensure prompt reporting of 
potentially serious infectious disease threats to higher levels of 
government, including within the public health bureaucracy; provide 
timely and accurate information and warnings of outbreaks and 
epidemics to the public; facilitate mobilization of the full range of 
state and societal resources necessary to address a public health 
emergency; and prevent fragmented, even balkanized, responses by 
local officials that impede coherent and coordinated responses.6 
The framework put in place after SARS and before COVID 
included numerous legal and regulatory measures.7  Core elements 
 
6 For discussions of the Chinese government’s handling of the SARS epidemic, 
see Jacques deLisle, SARS, Greater China, and the Pathologies of Globalization 
and Transition, 47 ORBIS 587, 595–601 (2003); Yanzhong Huang, The SARS 
Epidemic and Its Aftermath in China: A Political Perspective, in LEARNING FROM 
SARS 116, 124–25 (Stacey Knobler et al. eds., 2004).  For a general description 
of SARS, see SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION [WHO], https://www.who.int/ith/diseases/sars/en 
[https://perma.cc/X44S-AT2W] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020). 
7 For a discussion of the response mechanisms developed by the Chinese 
government after the SARS epidemic, see Shen Kui, The Delayed Response in 
Wuhan Reveals Legal Holes, REG. REV. (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/04/20/delayed-response-wuhan-reveals-legal-
holes [https://perma.cc/CWH4-AKWJ]; Steven Lee Myers, China Created a Fail-
Safe System to Track Contagions. It Failed., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/29/world/asia/coronavirus-china.html 
[https://perma.cc/N724-RREA].  See also Weishengbu Guanyu Jibing Yufang 
Kongzhi Tixi Jianshe de Ruogan Guiding (卫生部关于疾病预防控制体系建设
的若干规定) [Provisions on the Establishment of the Disease Control and 
Prevention System] (promulgated by Ministry of Health, Jan. 5, 2005, effective 
Jan. 5, 2005), CLI.4.56620 (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Provisions on Disease 
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included the Law on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious 
Diseases [Chuanranbing Fangzhi Fa] (“Infectious Disease Law,” 
adopted in 1989, revised in 2004 and again in 2013), the Emergency 
Response Law [Tufa Shijian Yingdui Fa] (enacted in 2007, and 
greatly influenced by the SARS experience a few years earlier),8 and 
an infectious disease outbreak Direct Reporting System [Zhibao 
Xitong] to the China Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
(adopted in 2004)).9  These and other law-centered mechanisms are, 
of course, only one part of what structured the response to COVID-
19, but they are important in understanding what happened—for good 
and for ill—and why.  Laws and regulations are, among other things, 
how the state “talks to itself”10—a significant channel mechanism 
that a regime’s leaders use to communicate with lower-level officials 
and structure their incentives.  The laws and rules relevant to public 
health emergencies, and interactions among them, reflect and 
instantiate features of the Chinese administrative state and 
governance that significantly influenced China’s successes and 
failures in responding to COVID-19. 
SYSTEMIC WEAKNESSES AND A DELAYED RESPONSE 
The state’s response to COVID-19 was much quicker than its 
response to SARS, which entailed a lag of more than two months 
between the first known appearance of the novel atypical pneumonia 
in southern China in November 2002 and Guangdong provincial 
health officials’ initial, albeit limited, public confirmation of the 
emerging epidemic, and another two months before the central 
government and top leadership openly acknowledged a severe and 
 
Control] (describing the legal regulatory mechanisms for responding to potential 
epidemics adopted after SARS).  
8 See generally Jacques deLisle, States of Exception in an Exceptional State: 
Emergency Powers Law in China, in EMERGENCY POWERS IN ASIA 342–390 
(Victor V. Ramraj & Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2010). 
9 Public Health Surveillance and Information Services, CHINESE CTR. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.chinacdc.cn/en/aboutus/orc_9349/ 
[https://perma.cc/YB28-QPBC] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020). 
10 Kim Lane Scheppele, Exceptions that Prove the Rule Embedding Emergency 
Government in Everyday Constitutional Life, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY (Jeffrey Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., 2010) 129–130. 
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ongoing crisis and began earnest efforts to contain the outbreak.11  
The more rapid initial moves to address COVID-19 still were 
dangerously delayed, however, and slower than Chinese authorities 
had hoped given the reforms adopted after SARS.12   
Although establishing a date when authorities should have 
taken major measures to address the serious and highly 
communicable new illness is a tricky business, reasons for grave 
concern were present weeks before the central government’s decision 
in late January 2020 to lock down Wuhan. 13   The first cases of 
patients with symptoms of an atypical pneumonia occurred by the 
beginning of December 2019 (and perhaps two weeks earlier), with 
the first reports reaching Wuhan local disease control and prevention 
authorities before the end of the month.  By the end of December, Dr. 
Li Wenliang’s WeChat messages—including ones relaying 
information provided to him by Dr. Ai Fen, the head of the emergency 
 
11 Update 95—SARS: Chronology of a Serial Killer, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION [WHO] (July 4, 2003), 
https://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_07_04/en/ [https://perma.cc/ESA9-CGUS]; 
Elisabeth Rosenthal, The SARS Epidemic: The Path, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2003), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/27/world/the-sars-epidemic-the-path-from-
china-s-provinces-a-crafty-germ-breaks-out.html [https://perma.cc/KH8G-
VHUN].  
12 Estimating the costs of delay is very difficult and highly controversial.  One 
study asserts that a three-week earlier imposition of a lockdown of Wuhan—
which was done on January 23, 2020—could have prevented 95% of the spread, 
and a one-week earlier lockdown could have prevented two-thirds of the spread.  
See Shengjie Lai et al., Effect of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions for 
Containing the COVID-19 Outbreak in China, MEDRXIV (Mar. 13, 2020), at 12–
13, https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.03.20029843v3.full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3WHM-ZTSM].  
13 See Chris Buckley & Steven Lee Myers, As New Coronavirus Spread, China’s 
Old Habits Delayed Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/01/world/asia/china-coronavirus.html 
(describing the lag between emergence of disease and government’s public 
acknowledgements, and reasons for that lag); Chaolin Huang et al., Clinical 
Features of Patients Infected with 2019 Novel Coronavirus in Wuhan, China, 395 
LANCET 497, 500–03 (2020) (describing the seriousness of the disease outbreak 
several weeks prior to the shutting down of Wuhan).  Yang Hai (杨海), Wuhan 
Zaoqi Yiqing Shangbao Weihe Yidu Zhongduan (武汉早期疫情上报为何一度
中断) [Why the Early Report of the Epidemic Situation in Wuhan Was 
Interrupted], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO (中国青年报) [CHINA YOUTH DAILY] 
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/69pdSrjNH_4qN3RrQ-Yk0Q 
[https://perma.cc/A9CC-BNK9].  
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department of a major Wuhan hospital—reporting multiple cases of 
a possibly contagious, SARS-like illness were being widely shared in 
Wuhan—so much so that they soon drew the attention of local public 
security authorities, who moved to stop their circulation. 14   On 
December 31, the NHC and the CDC dispatched the first team of 
experts to Wuhan, with two others following on January 8 and 
January 18.  Also on December 31, China informed the WHO’s 
country office about a cluster of cases of “pneumonia of unknown 
etiology,” and the Wuhan branch of the NHC began issuing public 
warnings about an “unexplained pneumonia” outbreak.15  On New 
Year’s Day, local authorities closed Wuhan’s Huanan Seafood 
 
14 Fighting Covid-19: China in Action, STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. P.R.C. (June 
2020), § I (providing detailed official chronology of COVID-19 in China).  See 
also Coronavirus: What Did China Do About Early Outbreak?, BBC (June 9, 
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-52573137 [https://perma.cc/BVZ5-
UHYQ] (providing chronology of events and responses in December 2019 to 
January 2020); Josephine Ma, Coronavirus: China’s First Confirmed Covid-19 
Case Traced Back to November 17, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-
first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back [https://perma.cc/Z7MH-3736]; Gong 
Jingqi, Fa Shaozi de Ren (发哨子的人) [The Person Who Handed Out the 
Whistle], RENWU (人物) [PEOPLE] (Mar. 10, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/sggfhq8 
[https://perma.cc/QRU4-63P2] (describing early warnings sent by Dr. Ai to her 
college classmates and colleagues about a SARS-like illness); Lily Kuo, 
Coronavirus: Wuhan Doctor Speaks Out Against Authorities, GUARDIAN (Mar. 
11, 2020, 4:50 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/11/coronavirus-wuhan-doctor-ai-
fen-speaks-out-against-authorities [https://perma.cc/63F2-5TFY] (describing Ai’s 
warnings, and explaining that Li had spread Ai’s warnings about the disease); He 
Warned of Coronavirus. Here’s What He Told Us Before He Died., N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/world/asia/Li-Wenliang-
china-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/67WR-FV7G]; Li Wenliang 
(@xiaolwl), WEIBO (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://m.weibo.cn/u/1139098205?uid=1139098205&luicode=1 
[https://perma.cc/ANQ7-NVHS]. 
15 Pneumonia of Unknown Cause—China, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
[WHO] (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-pneumonia-
of-unkown-cause-china/en/ [https://perma.cc/L4QK-52FN]; NHC Take Positive 
Actions to Fight New Coronavirus, NAT'L HEALTH COMM'N P.R.C. (Jan. 20, 
2020), http://en.nhc.gov.cn/2020-01/20/c_76000.htm; Takeaways From Internal 
Documents on China's Virus Response, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/article/a75e4e452f5a2d0ecaa241ca2045599e. 
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Wholesale Market, a suspected source of COVID-19’s crossover into 
the human population.16   
Before the middle of January (and perhaps as early as very 
late December when Dr. Zhang Jixian encountered a cluster of cases 
among a family), there appears to have been ample evidence of 
transmission of COVID-19 between people, and thus, signs of a 
potential epidemic. The risk of a pandemic was underscored by the 
first report of a case outside China on January 13, the first report of a 
case in China outside of Wuhan on January 19, and the first reported 
case of confirmed human-to-human transmission outside of China on 
January 24. 17   Serious concern about the atypical pneumonia 
outbreak, now identified as caused by a novel coronavirus, had taken 
hold among top-level national authorities by the middle of the month.  
On January 14, NHC chief Ma Xiaowei held a confidential 
teleconference, which was followed by documents issuing detailed 
“internal instructions”—directing provincial officials to prepare to 
respond to an epidemic and telling health commissions in Wuhan and 
Hubei to strengthen monitoring, social management and other 
measures to control the spread of the novel illness.18  The CDC set up 
 
16 For a discussion of the causes of Coronavirus and of the potential link between 
Coronavirus and “wet markets,” see Dina Fine Maron, ‘Wet Markets’ Likely 
Launched the Coronavirus, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/2020/04/coronavirus-linked-to-
chinese-wet-markets; Wuhan Seafood Market May Not Be Only Source of Novel 
Coronavirus: Expert, XINHUA (Jan. 29, 2020, 12:49 PM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/29/c_138741063.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QA9F-58NJ]; Carolyn Kormann, From Bats to Human Lungs, 
the Evolution of a Coronavirus, NEW YORKER (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.newyorker.com/science/elements/from-bats-to-human-lungs-the-
evolution-of-a-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/Z5F4-9WV6]. 
17 Novel Coronavirus—Thailand (ex-China), WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
[WHO] (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.who.int/csr/don/14-january-2020-novel-
coronavirus-thailand-ex-china/en/ [https://perma.cc/R5TS-XA7D] (describing 
first confirmed case outside China, in Thailand, of a traveler from Wuhan); Novel 
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report—4, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
[WHO] (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200124-sitrep-4-2019-
ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=9272d086_8 [https://perma.cc/V98Q-LFJ4] (reporting a case of 
apparent human to human transmission in Vietnam). 
18 See supra the sources cited in note 15. 
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working groups to dispatch resources and gather information to 
affected areas.19 
But it was not until January 20 that Zhong Nanshan—an 84-
year-old expert in respiratory diseases who led  the third team of 
experts sent to Wuhan20 and who had become prominent during the 
SARS epidemic for developing treatments and publicly warning 
against overly optimistic official statements that the epidemic was 
 
19 See China Didn’t Warn Public of Likely Pandemic for 6 Key Days, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/68a9e1b91de4ffc166acd6012d82c2f9 [https://perma.cc/XJ74-
H4KG]; China Publishes Timeline on COVID-19 Information Sharing, Int’l 
Cooperation, XINHUA (Apr. 6, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-
04/06/c_138951662.htm [https://perma.cc/3QTY-SRYV] (tracing the timeline of 
COVID-19 and the Chinese government’s responses to the disease and its 
spread); Yao Yuan et al., Xinhua Headlines: Chinese Doctor Recalls First 
Encounter with Mysterious Virus, XINHUA (Apr. 16, 2020),  
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-04/16/c_138982435.htm 
[https://perma.cc/P9X8-WTZ2] (describing Dr. Zhang Jixian’s report of suspicion 
on December 27 of person-to-person transmission based on a cluster of cases 
within a family); Guojia Weisheng Wei Queren Wosheng Shouli Shuruxing 
Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu de Feiyan Quezhen Bingli (国家卫生健康委确认我
省首例输入性新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎确诊病例) [National Health 
Commission Confirms Our Province’s First Imported Confirmed Case of Novel 
Coronavirus Infection Pneumonia], HEALTH COMM'N GUANGDONG PROVINCE 
(Jan. 20, 2020), http://wsjkw.gd.gov.cn/zwyw_yqxx/content/post_2876057.html 
[https://perma.cc/BPB8-C4VZ]; Guojia Weisheng Jiankang Wei Zhaokai 
Quanguo Dianshi Dianhua Huiyi Bushu Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran 
Feiyan Fangkong Gongzuo (国家卫生健康委召开全国电视电话会议部署新型
冠状病毒感染肺炎防控工作) [National Health Commission Held a National 
Video Conference to Deploy the Prevention and Control of New Coronavirus 
Infection Pneumonia], NAT’L HEALTH COMM’N P.R.C. (Jan. 14, 2020) 
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/xcs/fkdt/202002/e5e8a132ef8b42d484e6df53d4d110c1.sh
tml (describing Ma Xiaowei’s teleconference on current responses to the noval 
Coronavirus and directions for health commissions in Wuhan and Hubei). 
20 Biography of the Journal Editor-in-Chief Prof. Dr. Nanshan Zhong, J. 
THORACIC DISEASE, http://jtd.amegroups.com/about/editorInChief 
[https://perma.cc/9952-NQ3D] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020); All Things 
Considered, Meet Dr. Zhong Nanshan, The Public Face of the COVID-19 Fight in 
China, NPR (Apr. 15, 2020, 4:18 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/04/15/835308147/meet-dr-zhong-nanshan-the-public-
face-of-the-covid-19-fight-in-china [https://perma.cc/L4HU-FA6Y] (describing 
Dr. Zhong’s role in the Chinese government’s response to COVID-19).  
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waning in April 200321—stated publicly that the illness could be 
spread from person to person.  Xi Jinping made a public 
announcement on the same day, declaring that all Chinese 
Communist Party committees and governments at all levels should 
take effective measures to address the virus.22  Authorities declared 
the new virus to be subject to the mandatory reporting regime for 
“Class B” diseases and directed that the strict disease control and 
prevention measures for a “Class A” pathogen (under the Infectious 
Disease Law) would be applied.23  For the first time, on January 21, 
People’s Daily carried several stories—and gave prominent 
coverage—to the outbreak.24   
During the six days preceding these announcements, Wuhan 
had seen thousands of new cases, city officials had allowed a large 
annual community banquet to go forward, and the busy Lunar New 
 
21 Physician Who Played Pivotal Role in Battling SARS Once Again Serves the 
People amid New Epidemic, GLOB. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020), 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1179589.shtml [https://perma.cc/45HE-
NY88]; Emily Feng & Amy Cheng, They Call Him a Hero: Dr. Zhong is the 
Public Face of China’s War against Coronavirus, NPR (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/02/825957192/dr-zhong-is-
the-supreme-commander-in-china-s-war-against-coronavirus 
[https://perma.cc/THV2-Z2GY]. 
22 Zhou Chuqing (周楚卿), Xi Jingping Dui Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran 
de Feiyan Yiqing Zuochu Zhongyao Zhishi; Qiangdiao Yaoba Renmin Qunzhong 
Shengming Anquan He Shenti Jiankang Fangzai Diyiwei; Jianjue Ezhi Yiqing 
Manyan Shitou; Li Keqiang Zuochu Pishi (习近平对新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎
疫情作出重要指示 强调要把人民群众生命安全和身体健康放在第一位 坚决
遏制疫情蔓延势头 李克强作出批示 [Xi Jinping Issues an Important Instruction 
on Novel Coronavirus Infectious Pneumonia Epidemic; Emphasis on the People’s 
Lives and Health in the First Place; Resolutely Contain the Epidemic Spread; Li 
Keqiang Issues Instructions], XINHUA (Jan. 20, 2020, 7:27 PM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-01/20/c_1125486561.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EJP9-SUJS].  
23 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Weisheng Jiankang Weiyuanhui 
Gonggao (中华人民共和国国家卫生健康委员会公告, 2020 年第 1 号) 
[Announcement of the National Health Commission of the People's Republic of 
China, 2020 No.1], NAT'L HEALTH COMM'N P.R.C. (Jan. 20, 2020), 
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/jkj/s7916/202001/44a3b8245e8049d2837a4f27529cd386.
shtml [https://perma.cc/N9YT-LE8M].  See also infra text accompanying note 
139.  
24 Six Stories on the Novel Coronavirus, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Jan. 21, 2020), 
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2020-01/21/nbs.D110000renmrb_01.htm 
[https://perma.cc/32RD-XQH4].  See also infra text accompanying note 139. 
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Year travel season had begun.25  On January 23, a directive to lock 
down Wuhan was issued, and extraordinarily severe restrictions 
followed.26  Travel to and from the city was prohibited.  Businesses 
were closed.  Residents were largely confined to their apartments, 
except for very limited forays for medical treatment, with daily 
 
25 See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 19 (detailing the early timeline of COVID-
19, its spread, and how local and central governments reacted); Chen Chen (陈尘
), Wuhan Wanjia Shipin Liuchu; Zhiqing Ren Zaibao Shijian Neiqing (武汉万家
宴视频流出 知情人再曝事件内情) [Wuhan 10,000 Families Banquet Video 
Released: Insiders Retell the Story], JUJIAO WANG (聚焦网) [CBF] (Feb. 14, 
2020, 9:38 AM), http://www.cbfau.com/cbf-201585780.html 
[https://perma.cc/PWH5-XAG2] (describing that a banquet was held in Baibuting, 
Wuhan with more than 40,000 families participating); Liang Shiting (梁施婷), 
Wanjiayan 26 Tian Hou, Wuren Zhidao Wuhan Baibuting Xinguan Feiyan 
Quezhen Shuliang (万家宴 26 天后，无人知道武汉百步亭新冠肺炎确诊数量) 
[26 Days after the 10,000 Families Banquet, Number of Confirmed Cases of 
Novel Coronavirus in Baibuting, Wuhan Unknown], SHIDAI CAIJING (时代财经) 
[TIME WKLY. FIN.] (Feb. 13, 2020, 8:13 PM), 
https://www.sohu.com/a/372824937_237556 [https://perma.cc/4T5R-2DYV] 
(reporting that there were no testing of COVID-19 and no control over entrance 
into Baibuting). 
26 See Wuhan Municipality Novel Coronavirus Infection Pneumonia Epidemic 
Prevention and Control Command Center, Wuhan Shi Xinxing Guanzhaung 
Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Zhihui Bu Tonggao (Di 1 Hao) (武汉
市新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情防控指挥部通告（第 1 号）) [Notice from 
the Municipal Novel Coronavirus Infection Pneumonia Epidemic Prevention and 
Control Command Center (No. 1)], STATE COUNCIL P.R.C. (Jan. 23, 2020), 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-01/23/content_5471751.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XA9R-NUFA]; Yao Pan (姚盼), Xiaoqu Weihe Yao Fengbi 
Guanli? Zhixing de Zenyang? Jumin Shenghuo Ruhe Baozhang? Jizhe Tanfang 
Wuhan Sanzhen Kan Zhixing (小区为何要封闭管理？执行得怎样？居民生活
如何保障？ 记者探访武汉三镇看执行) [Why are Communities Shut 
Down? How Effective are the Showdowns? How to Protect the Lives of 
Residents? Reporters Visited Three Towns in Wuhan to Examine the 
Implementation], HUBEISHENG RENMIN ZHENGFU (湖北省人民政府) [HUBEI 
PROVINCIAL PEOPLE’S GOV’T] (Feb. 16, 2020, 11:05 AM), 
https://www.hubei.gov.cn/zhuanti/2020/gzxxgzbd/qfqk/202002/t20200216_20388
56.shtml [https://perma.cc/V546-N28H] (reporting, among other resrictions, that 
only one exit is left open in a neighborhood with staff watching and recording 24 
hours a day); Lily Kuo, Coronavirus: Panic and Anger in Wuhan as China 
Orders City into Lockdown, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2020, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/23/coronavirus-panic-and-anger-in-
wuhan-as-china-orders-city-into-lockdown#maincontent [https://perma.cc/CXL2-
UGPW]. 
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necessities being brought in by small cohorts authorized to do so.  
Similar measures were soon imposed in other emerging hotspots, and 
a “Level 1” emergency (the most serious in Chinese law’s 4-level 
public health emergency scale) was declared, within days, at 
provincial levels throughout the country.27 
Pervasive and enduring attributes of Chinese governance—
ones that had been on display in the SARS crisis as well—contributed 
to problems in the initial handling of the COVID-19 outbreak.  One 
set of issues was what analysts call tiao-tiao/kuai-kuai and the 
 
27 See, e.g., Peter Hessler, Life on Lockdown in China, NEW YORKER (Mar. 23, 
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/03/30/life-on-lockdown-in-
china [https://perma.cc/5MTJ-E7RE]; Emma Graham-Harrison & Lily Kuo, 
China’s Coronavirus Lockdown Strategy: Brutal but Effective, GUARDIAN (Mar. 
19, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/19/chinas-coronavirus-
lockdown-strategy-brutal-but-effective (describing shutdown during the early 
spread of the COVID-19); He Miao & Xiao Jinbo (何淼 & 孝金波), Wuhan 
Quanshi Xiaoqu Fengbi Guanli Jizhe Tanfang Shequ Ruhe Yankong “Liuliang” (
武汉全市小区封闭管理 记者探访社区如何严控“流量”) [Communities are 
Shut Down All Over Wuhan; Reporters Visited Communities to See How to Limit 
“Flow” Strictly], RENMIN WANG (人民网) [PEOPLE] (Feb. 12, 2020, 10:51 AM), 
http://society.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0212/c431577-31583540.html 
[https://perma.cc/3WTK-J5TZ]; Sun Hongyang (孙宏阳), Beijing Daolu Shengji 
Keyun Yi Yue Ershiliu Ri Qi Quanbu Tingyun (北京道路省际客运 1 月 26 日起
全部停运) [All Inter-Provincial Passenger Transportation in Beijing to Cease 
Service Beginning January 26], CAIXIN (Jan. 25, 2020, 8:17 PM), 
https://china.caixin.com/2020-01-25/101508364.html [https://perma.cc/X5QK-
8HVK] (reporting that all bus in and out Beijing stopped operating since January 
26, 2020); FANG FANG, WUHAN DIARY: DISPATCHES FROM A QUARANTINED CITY 
(Michael Berry trans., 2020) (describing experience of lockdown and aspects of 
lockdown measures in Wuhan); Li Ning (李宁), Quanguo Duoge Shengshi 
Xuanbu Zanting Shengji Keyun Banxian (全国多个省市宣布暂停省际客运班线
) [Many Provinces and Cities Across the Country Announced Suspension of Inter-
Provincial Passenger Lines], MINISTRY TRANSP. P.R.C. (Jan. 27, 2020), 
http://www.mot.gov.cn/zhuanti/2020chunyun_ZT/gedidongtai/202001/t20200127
_3418635.html [https://perma.cc/BZM5-UT63] (reporting that inter-province 
buses stopped operation since January 26, 2020); Updates on Coronavirus 
Outbreak (Januay 22–March 9), GLOB. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020).  
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1181093.shtml [https://perma.cc/TQ2Y-
F5HF] (reporting that 30 of 31 provincial-level entities had declared Level 1 
emergencies by January 25, 2020).  Emergency Response Law, infra note 29, art. 
42 (concerning the four levels of emergency). 
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resulting pattern of “dual rule.”28  Officials at a subnational level with 
responsibilities for a field of regulation answer simultaneously to two 
masters:  “vertically” to their superiors in a functionally defined, 
hierarchical bureaucratic structure that reaches up to a ministry in 
charge of the same field, or a similar central government entity, in 
Beijing (for which the metaphor is tiao—a long, narrow piece); and 
“horizontally” to the general-purpose government at the official’s 
own level—provincial, municipal, or still-lower (for which the 
analogy is kuai—a lump or block).   
Sensible rationales support both approaches to governance, 
both in general and in the specific context of the means for addressing 
outbreaks of contagious diseases that were in place when the COVID-
19 pandemic began.  Key promises of tiao measures include giving 
experts—in public health, medicine, and relevant fields of science—
early access to information and greater authority to shape responses 
when a serious contagious disease outbreak threatens.  Such rules rely 
on national public health and medical experts to reach informed and 
authoritative judgments, shape policy decisions, and make 
announcements promptly.  Especially when the danger is, or seems 
likely to become, national or international in scope, rules requiring 
rapid reporting through specialized channels to top levels can 
expedite and inform central-level policy determinations—including 
by the nation’s top leadership in serious cases—and adoption of 
geographically widespread measures, as well as engagement with 
foreign counterparts and relevant international bodies (such as the 
WHO).   
Rules that emphasize kuai recognize that effective 
responses—and, often, effective detection—in cases of potential 
epidemics must rely on local officials to monitor developments in 
 
28 See generally Paul E. Schroeder, Territorial Actors as Competitors for Power: 
The Case of Hubei and Wuhan, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION 
MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 283, 283–307 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. 
Lampton eds., 1992) (discussing dual rule in the context of the “competition for 
power between Hubei province and its capital city, Wuhan”); KENNETH 
LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS, 
STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES 141 (Princeton Univ. Press 1988) (describing tiao-
tiao, kuai-kuai and “dual rule” in energy sector policymaking in China); Andrew 
C. Mertha, China’s “Soft” Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations, 
184 CHINA Q. 791, 792–810 (2005) (discussing relations between central and 
local government authorities in terms of tiao, kuai, and mechanisms of central 
control).  
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their regions, guide the work of local branches of the public health 
and infectious disease agencies, coordinate across front-line 
government units, exercise authority over lower-level officials and 
medical service providers under their jurisdiction, and mobilize state 
and social resources. 29   Such rules also assign early-stage 
responsibility to officials who, in practice and often in principle, will 
be held principally accountable for bad outcomes.30   
Either tiao or kuai structures can help to avoid some of the 
problems associated with China’s multi-layered bureaucracy.  Clear 
imposition of responsibility at a particular tier of government (kuai) 
can limit opportunities for “passing the buck upward.”  Strong 
requirements for rapid reporting to central authorities in the relevant 
specialized bureaucracy (tiao) can cut through or bypass the delays 
that plague comprehensive level-by-level decision-making.   
Key elements of the Emergency Response Law principally 
focus on kuai—geographic units.  The law assigns a leadership role 
and primary responsibility for planning, preparing for, detecting, 
declaring (at any four levels of severity), informing and warning 
about, and responding to public health incidents (and other 
emergencies) to the most local-level government with jurisdiction 
over the affected area (starting at the county level).  Roles and powers 
of local government include coordinating across local branches of 
specialized government departments (including those focused on 
public health and disease control and prevention), ordering 
restrictions on social and economic activities, taking other 
preventative measures, and mobilizing public and private resources.  
This kuai system is tiered, with obligations to report expeditiously to 
 
29 This perspective is amply reflected in the Emergency Response Law.  See 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tufa Shijian Yingduifa (中华人民共和国突发事
件应对法) [Emergency Response Law of the People's Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, 
effective Nov. 1, 2007), art. 44–45, 48–49), CLI.1.96791(EN) (Lawinfochina) 
[hereinafter Emergency Response Law] (setting forth powers and duties of local, 
geographic unit-based government to coordinate across government departments 
at local level and to coordinate responses to public health incidents).  
30 See infra the discussion accompanying note 105, concerning firing of officials 
for assessed failures in responding to COVID-19 and, earlier, SARS.  
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higher-level governments (ordinarily, the next-higher-level 
government) when an emergency occurs.31    
The Infectious Disease Law includes many kindred 
provisions concerning epidemics of serious contagious diseases.  It 
assigns to the people’s governments at various levels responsibility 
for directing the work of prevention of infectious diseases, issuing 
timely early warnings concerning outbreaks and possible epidemics 
of infectious diseases, and receiving reports of epidemics.  Such 
reports are received from hospitals and other relevant units within a 
jurisdiction under the principle of shudi guanli [local management] 
and from the same-governmental-level branch of the principal public 
health bureaucracies:  the weisheng xingzheng bumen [health 
administration department] (that is, the same-level “health 
commission” such as the Wuhan Health Commission (WHC) or the 
Hubei Health Commission (HHC), and the same-level “disease 
control and prevention institutions” such as the local branches of the 
CDC).  The law also gives people’s governments at various levels 
authority—again, in a tiered kuai structure—to address infectious 
disease outbreaks in their jurisdictions by imposing isolation or 
quarantine measures (which must be reported to the next-higher-level 
government), ordering shutdowns of economic and social activities 
and other emergency measures (with approval from the next-higher-
level government), suspending transportation (in order to check the 
spread of an outbreak), and declaring an “epidemic area”—thereby 
authorizing an area-wide imposition of the above-described 
restrictions (again, with the approval of the next-higher-level 
government).  The Law also gives governments at various levels 
powers to mobilize people and resources to address an epidemic, and 
to oversee specialized disease control and prevention institutions at 
the same level.32 
 
31 Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 7–9, 12, 17, 20, 25–26, 29, 31–
32, 37–39, 42–45, 48–49, 52–53.  See also Tufa Gongong Weisheng Shijian 
Yingji Tiaoli (突发公共卫生事件应急条例) [Regulations on Responses to 
Public Health Emergencies] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 7, 2003, rev’d 
Jan. 8, 2011, effective Jan. 8, 2011), art. 4, CLI.2.174915 (EN) (Lawinfochina) 
[hereinafter Regulations on Responses] (directing the people’s government at 
relevant level to establish ad hoc headquarters/command bodies and act as the 
principal director of response to emergency). 
32 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chuanranbing Fangzhifa (中华人民共和国传
染病防治法) [Law of the People's Republic of China on Prevention and 
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Other elements in the relevant legal and regulatory structure 
emphasize tiao.  The Emergency Response Law includes such 
elements as:  tasking departments under the State Council, including 
the NHC, with developing emergency response plans and structures 
and establishing criteria for each of the four levels of emergencies 
(including public health emergencies); directing that when a specific 
law or regulation provides that a national-level department under the 
State Council, such as the NHC, is responsible for responding to an 
emergency, the specific law or regulation governs; and authorizing 
relevant departments under the State Council (or the State Council 
itself) to take necessary measures when an emergency seriously 
affects the national economy.33  Under related regulations on public 
health emergencies, the NHC system has the roles of dispatching 
experts to assess possible public health emergencies, determining the 
category of an emergency within the Class A/B/C categories of 
infectious diseases, and informing lower level health commissions 
(HCs) of the existence of a public health emergency.34  
The Infectious Disease Law, and related regulations and rules, 
similarly provide that the NHC, along with local-level HCs, are in 
charge of prevention, treatment, supervision and control of infectious 
diseases.  The Law gives the NHC mandates to monitor and 
investigate potential infectious disease epidemics and public health 
emergencies, to establish the required means and terms for hospitals 
and other units to report on potential epidemics and emergencies, to 
receive such reports from those units and state disease control and 
prevention organs (the local CDCs), to issue timely warnings about 
epidemics and emergencies to other relevant peer institutions, lower-
level HCs, and lower-level disease control and prevention organs, and 
to receive reports on epidemics from lower-level HCs.  The Law also 
gives the NHC and its subordinate provincial HCs (in some aspects 
contingent on NHC authorization) the power and obligation to issue 
early warnings and prompt notifications to the public concerning 
epidemics.35  
 
Treatment of Infectious Diseases] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Feb. 21, 1989, rev’d June 29, 2013, effective June. 29, 2013), art. 
5, 19, 20, 30, 33, 41–45 [hereinafter Infectious Disease Law]. 
33 Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 7, 17–18, 42, 51. 
34 Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, art. 23–30. 
35 Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 3–4, 6, 17, 19, 34–35, 38; 
Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, art. 25 (concerning the authority of the 
82 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 16 
 
These same laws give the CDC (as the state disease control 
and prevention institution) and its provincial and lower-level 
branches related powers and functions in addressing potential 
outbreaks of infectious diseases, epidemics, and public health 
emergencies: monitoring, receiving reports (including from frontline 
medical units concerning cases of infectious diseases of uncertain 
origin), undertaking analyses, forecasting trends, providing 
information platforms, reporting to higher authorities (including to 
HCs), and proposing responsive measures. 36   As the foregoing 
suggests, the structure contemplated by these tiao-side provisions is 
hierarchical and top-down, with the NHC directing and overseeing 
provincial and more local-level HCs, and the CDC system, with its 
local organs, following a similar arrangement .37 
The Direct Reporting System sought to strengthen the tiao 
side.  As described by the NHC Director to the National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee in 2013, the Direct Reporting System 
had “realized real-time direct online reporting of infectious diseases 
prescribed by law” in well over 90% of medical institutions at all 
levels, with average reporting time to each higher level institution 
falling from five days to four hours—an achievement that approached 
performance standards set forth in relevant regulations.38 
 
Health Administration Department of the State Council to authorize lower-level 
Health Administration Departments to release information concerning 
emergencies within their territorial jurisdictions). 
36 Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 17–18, 30, 33, 40; Regulations on 
Responses, supra note 31, art. 12–15; Tufa Gonggong Weisheng Shinjian yu 
Chuanranbing Yiqing Jiance Xinxi Baogao Guanli Banfa (突发公共卫生事件与
传染病疫情监测信息报告管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of 
Information Reporting on Monitoring Public Health Emergencies and Epidemics 
of Infectious Diseases] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Nov. 7, 2003, rev’d Aug. 26, 2006, effective Aug. 26, 2006), art. 8, 24, 29, 
[hereinafter Measures for Information Reporting]. 
37 See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 6, 34–35, 53–58; Regulations 
on Responses, supra note 31, art. 4. 
38 Guowuyuan Guanyu Chuanranbing Fangzhi Gongzuo he Chuanranbing 
Fangzhifa Shishi Qingkuang de Baogao (国务院关于传染病防治工作和传染病
防治法实施情况的报告) [Report of the State Council on Work on Control and 
Prevention of Infectious Diseases and Implementation of the Law on Control and 
Prevention of Infectious Diseases], NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:04 
PM), http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2013-
08/28/content_1804522.htm [https://perma.cc/P77Z-XKT4] (report by Li Bin, 
Director of the National Health and Family Planning Commission); Measures for 
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Characteristics of tiao, kuai, and their uneasy coexistence, 
impeded the initial response to COVID-19.  Although many facts 
remain unconfirmed or contested, and we cannot know for sure 
individual actors’ motivations, authorities during the initial phase of 
COVID-19 acted in ways that were in keeping with the incentives 
that this structure of regulation and governance created.  
Kuai and Cover-Ups 
Actions by Wuhan officials that slowed the response to 
COVID-19 reflected risks of mishandling endemic to the kuai side of 
China’s Janus-faced structure of governance.  These risks primarily 
take the form of a “double or nothing bet” that faces local officials.  
When encountering a problem of uncertain seriousness (with a novel, 
possibly communicable illness being one of many possible examples), 
an official can report the emerging issue to superiors.  In some cases, 
this is mandated by legal or policy requirements (as with the Direct 
Reporting System, the Infectious Disease Law, and other relevant law, 
in the case of COVID-19).  Doing so, however, may have little upside 
for the official.  It often will not be clear whether the counterfactual—
the outcome to be avoided by proper reporting and the responses such 
reporting should trigger—would have been a deadly pandemic, or 
merely a fleeting concern (as new infectious diseases often have been 
in various parts of China in recent years), the avoidance of which 
would not be regarded as a significant accomplishment and the 
reporting of which might be seen as an attempt to shirk responsibility 
by passing an issue up the chain.39   
 
Information Reporting, supra note 36, art. 20; Regulations on Responses, supra 
note 31, art. 19; Quanguo Buming Yuanyin Feiyan Bingli Jiance Shishi Fangan 
(Shixing) (全国不明原因肺炎病例监测实施方案(试行)) [National 
Implementation Plan for Surveillance of Pneumonia Cases of Unknown Etiology 
(Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the Ministry of Health, July 9, 2004, 
effective July 9, 2004), CLI.4.54421 (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter National 
Implementation Plan] (establishing the procedure for hospitals, local CDCs and 
HCs to diagnose, report, and handle pneumonia of unknown etiology). 
39 Although SARS and COVID-19 proved to be disastrous pandemics, other 
potentially epidemic viruses had been contained in recent years in China without 
resort to extraordinary measures.  See, e.g., Pengfei Wei et al., Pains and Gains 
from China’s Experiences with Emerging Epidemics: From SARS to H7N9, 2016 
BIOMED. RSCH. INT’L., 2016, at 1–3, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4971293/ 
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Moreover, the outcome for an official who does report can be 
a good deal worse.  If the feared bad-case scenario that seemed to 
compel reporting does not materialize (or if responsive measures 
addressing a genuine threat are so successful that the seriousness of 
the danger is not comprehended), the official may be seen as having 
“cried wolf.”  A local official’s disclosing to the public, or reporting 
to superiors (which can trigger responses that lead to disclosure to the 
public), can cause panic in society or lead to state-imposed 
restrictions on economically or otherwise important activity.  In light 
of the resulting public harm caused by such preemptive or responsive 
measures, the official may then suffer career-damaging criticism for 
overreacting (or for being perceived by superiors as having done so).   
On the other side of the bet, an official can try to keep the 
facts about a problem that is not yet serious from getting out, hoping 
to resolve the matter quietly at the local level and without higher-level 
authorities or the public learning about it.  But, if the issue proves 
unmanageable and becomes known to higher-ups (whether through 
official channels, social or traditional media, or whistleblowers), the 
official may face significantly graver consequences than if he had 
reported promptly.  The initially unreported problem may become 
more harmful than it would have been if there had been prompt 
reporting, or the official’s superiors may perceive that to have been 
the case.  The responsibility and the risk of adverse consequences 
borne by the local official is correspondingly larger.  Still worse, in 
some cases (including some of those involving outbreaks of 
infectious diseases), the official also will have violated policy and 
legal requirements to report the emerging problem to higher-level 
authorities.  The local official’s violation of that bureaucratic 
obligation creates an additional basis for career-damaging sanctions, 
or worse. 
Much that occurred in the initial reaction to the novel 
coronavirus is consistent with the logic of this “fess up or cover up” 
choice for local officials.  Public security authorities in Wuhan 
squelched early reporting when they ordered Li Wenliang—along 
 
[https://perma.cc/H8NN-TPNX]; Jennifer Bouey, From SARS To 2019-
Coronavirus (nCoV): U.S.-China Collaborations on Pandemic Response, RAND 
CORP. (Feb. 5, 2020), at 2–12, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT523/RAND_
CT523.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXE4-3DRF].  
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with other doctors—to stop “spreading rumors” about the mystery 
illness, admonishing Li that his dissemination of “untrue” 
information through social media had “severely disrupted social 
order” and was “an illegal act,” and requiring Li to pledge 
cooperation.  Ai’s superiors at her hospital warned her to keep quiet 
and cease communicating about cases of the new virus.40  Reports 
from frontline hospital personnel such as Li Wenliang, Ai Fen, and 
Zhang Jixian could reach higher-level, state authorities through 
proper channels only with the approval of higher-ups at their hospitals, 
who did not comply with the Direct Reporting System to the CDC in 
December after the first cluster of unexplained pneumonia cases 
arrived in their institutions.41  Ai’s hospital, like Li’s, answered to the 
WHC.  According to one report, doctors at Wuhan hospitals were told 
that the WHC had issued a directive not to disclose information about 
the virus and the disease. 42   In early to mid-January, local and 
provincial health authorities reportedly narrowed the diagnostic 
 
40 Josh Rudolph, Translation: Li Wenliang’s “Admonishment Notice,” 
CHINA DIGIT. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2020), 
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/02/translation-li-wenliangs-
admonishment-notice/ [https://perma.cc/WF4M-M3TG] (providing 
photocopy and translation of the Wuhan Municipal Public Security 
Bereau’s Admonishment Notice to Li Wenliang); Amy Cheng, Chinese 
Authorities Admit Improper Response to Coronavirus Whistleblower, NPR (Mar. 
19, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-
updates/2020/03/19/818295972/chinese-authorities-admit-improper-response-to-
coronavirus-whistleblower [https://perma.cc/NK42-9XNG]; Kuo, supra note 14; 
Huang, supra note 13; Andrew Green, Li Wenliang, Obituary, 395 LANCET 682 
(Feb. 29, 2020) https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(20)30382-2/fulltext [https://perma.cc/6JJP-DBWK]; Gong, supra note 14 
(concerning Ai Fen); Wei Furong (魏芙蓉) et al., Wuhan Yiqing Chuqi, Wangluo 
Zhibao Xitong Weihe Shiling? (武汉疫情初期，网络直报系统为何失灵?) [Why Did 
the Direct Network Reporting System Fail at the Beginning of the Wuhan 
Epidemic?], PHOENIX NEW MEDIA (Mar. 14, 2020, 9:37 PM), 
http://news.ifeng.com/c/7uqH6A5PWt7 [https://perma.cc/7CXF-9XCY] 
[hereinafter Wuhan Yiqing] (also concerning Ai Fen). 
41 According to one detailed account, there was brief, but quickly suspended, use 
of the direct reporting system in early January.  See YANG, supra note 13; Wuhan 
Yiqing, supra note 40.  
42 Kristin Huang, Coronavirus: Wuhan Doctor Says Officials Muzzled Her for 
Sharing Report on WeChat, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 11, 2020, 1:38 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074622/coronavirus-wuhan-
doctor-says-officials-muzzled-her-sharing [https://perma.cc/S6CX-JR8V]. 
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standards for reporting cases, and required official—and ultimately 
HHC—consent for reporting.43   
In a move that, perhaps inadvertently, facilitated temporary 
concealment from higher-level officials and the public, local 
authorities had samples from initial patients sent to labs operated by 
companies in other provinces.44  When results indicated a possibly 
novel SARS-like coronavirus, the WHC issued two not-publicly-
disclosed emergency notices to local medical institutions concerning 
prevention and treatment of the pneumonia of unknown etiology.45  
According to several accounts, the CDC learned of the outbreak at 
the very end of December only from online leaked versions of the 
WHC’s pair of emergency notices.46  According to some accounts, an 
 
43Wuhan Yiqing, supra note 40 (reporting that series of instructions raising the 
approval requirements for reporting); Myers, supra note 7 (reporting authorities’ 
directives to hospitals to seek official approval before reporting cases / using 
direct reporting system); Walsh, supra note 5. 
44  Gao Yu et al., How Early Signs of the Coronavirus Were Spotted, Spread and 
Throttled in China, STRAIT TIMES (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/how-early-signs-of-the-coronavirus-
were-spotted-spread-and-throttled-in-china [https://perma.cc/68CM-ZHB7]; 
Yawen Chen & Cate Cadell, Confusion and Lost Time: How Testing Woes Slowed 
China's Coronavirus Response, REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-testing-insight/confusion-and-
lost-time-how-testing-woes-slowed-chinas-coronavirus-response-
idUSKBN1ZQ21K [https://perma.cc/6XDM-CLM9].  
45 See Wuhan Yiqing, supra note 40.  The two documents issues by the WHC 
were the “Emergency Notice on Reporting the Treatment of Pneumonia of 
Unexplained Cause” and the “Emergency Notice on Doing a Good Job in the 
Treatment of Pneumonia of Unexplained Cause.”  See Meiguo Guanyu Xinguan 
Feiyan Yiqing de Shehua Huangyan yu Shishi Zhenxiang (美国关于新冠肺炎疫
情的涉华谎言与事实真相) [Fact and Fiction About U.S. Lies Concerning China 
and the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic], PEOPLE’S DAILY (May 10, 2020), 
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2020-
05/10/nw.D110000renmrb_20200510_1-03.htm [https://perma.cc/X6Y2-GLDT].  
46 Dali L. Yang, Wuhan Officials Tried to Cover Up Covid-19—And Sent It 
Careening Outward, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2020, 6:43 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/10/wuhan-officials-tried-
cover-up-covid-19-sent-it-careening-outward/ [https://perma.cc/S7YJ-8NJ3]; 
Yang, supra note 13; Michael D. Swaine, Chinese Crisis Decision Making—
Managing the COVID-19 Pandemic, Part One: The Domestic Component, CHINA 
LEADERSHIP MONITOR (June 1, 2020), https://www.prcleader.org/swaine 
[https://perma.cc/Y3AQ-KDAE]; infra text accompanying notes 8–11; Myers, 
supra note 7. 
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HHC official directed local genomics labs to stop work on samples 
of the new virus in early January. 47  On January 12, the Shanghai 
laboratory headed by Zhang Yongzhen that had sequenced the novel 
coronavirus genome and published its findings was abruptly ordered 
to close temporarily.48 
When the NHC expert teams (formally sent jointly by the 
HHC) reached Wuhan, their access to vital information faced 
constraints from local actors.  WHC officials and hospital 
administrators steered their visits.  They appear to have directed—
successfully—medical staff to withhold information strongly 
indicating human-to-human transmission, and blocked access to 
formal reports on the discovery of the disease and the results of local 
investigations.  One member of the second team later complained, 
“They didn’t tell us the truth. . . . They were lying. . . . They didn’t 
cooperate with us at all.”49  That same team member credited the third 
group’s crucial determination that the disease was contagious among 
people to its leader Zhong’s expertise and to information from other 
localities that had become available by the time of the Zhong group’s 
visit.50  Even after the NHC and HHC issued a treatment plan for the 
novel illness, the WHC nominally complied but reportedly set—and 
communicated to hospitals—strict diagnostic criteria that led to 
continued serious understatement of cases.51 
 
47 Yang, supra note 46; Gao Yu et al., In Depth: How Early Signs of a SARS-Like 
Virus Were Spotted, Spread, and Throttled, CAIXIN GLOB. (Feb. 29, 2020) 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-02-29/in-depth-how-early-signs-of-a-sars-
like-virus-were-spotted-spread-and-throttled-101521745.html 
[https://perma.cc/JJ85-HFR2]; Myers, supra note 7.  
48 Zhuang Pinghui, Chinese Laboratory That First Shared Coronavirus Genome 
with World Ordered to Close for  
‘Rectification,’ Hindering its Covid-19 Research, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST 
(Feb. 28, 2020, 11:00 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3052966/chinese-laboratory-
first-shared-coronavirus-genome-world-ordered [https://perma.cc/F9XH-ZMXV].  
49 Yu Qin & Li Shiyun (俞琴 & 黎诗韵), Zhuanfang Weijianwei Pai Wuhan Di E
r Pi Zhuanjia: Weihe Mei Faxian Ren Chuan Ren? (专访卫健委派武汉第二批专
家:为何没发现人传人？) [Interview of Experts Sent by NHC to Wuhan: Why Wa
sn’t Inter-Personal Transmission Discovered?], SINA (Feb. 26, 2020, 6:28 PM), h
ttps://news.sina.cn/gn/2020-02-26/detail-iimxxstf4577244.d.html?from=wap [http
s://perma.cc/PD6W-KWTA]. 
50 Id. 
51 Yu & Li, supra note 49; Yang, supra note 46; Yang, supra note 13.  
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Much of this behavior flouted, or at best skirted, a variety of 
legal requirements.  These could include obligations of institutions 
(such as hospitals) and individuals (including medical staff) to report 
on disease outbreaks and potential epidemics (including the 
obligations under the Direct Reporting System and the Infections 
Disease Law, the Emergency Response Law, and related rules), and 
not to make false statements (including to investigating authorities).52  
More broadly, the many investigative, reporting, and informing 
missions assigned to health commissions and disease control and 
prevention institutions not only imposed affirmative obligations on 
such units in Wuhan and Hubei, but also implied duties of local 
officials not to impede (and, indeed, to support) the work of those 
sent out by higher-level units, including the NHC and the CDC.53   
The familiar “double or nothing bet” or “fess up or cover up” 
dilemma of Chinese governance was especially acute for Wuhan 
officials dealing with the novel coronavirus because of a few 
additional factors that were beyond their control.  One was the virus 
itself.  During the crucial few weeks of delayed response, it very 
likely was not clear to local officials that the new pathogen would 
prove to be so serious—much more dangerous (particularly in its 
propensity to spread rapidly) than SARS, or other, less serious disease 
outbreaks that have occurred in various parts of China in recent 
memory.   
Two other factors were accidents of the calendar.  Local 
officials made choices that impeded the flow of information to central 
authorities and the public on the eve of and during the annual sessions 
Wuhan Municipal (January 6–10) and subsequent the Hubei 
Provincial (January 12–17) People’s Congress and People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (the municipal and provincial legislature-
like organs and united front organs that convene in preparation for 
the March plenary meetings of the correlative national bodies in 
 
52 See, e.g., Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 12, 37, 69; Emergency 
Response Law, supra note 29, art. 65; Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, 
arts. 50–51; Measures for Information Reporting, arts. 10, 16–19; National 
Implementation Plan, supra note 38, §§ 2–3, 6. 
53 See, e.g., Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts, 18, 48, 65; Emergency 
Response Law, supra note 29, art. 65; Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, 
arts. 21, 47; Measures for Information Reporting, arts. 21, 34, 39; National 
Implementation Plan, supra note 38, §§ 4, 6. 
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Beijing),54 and shortly before the January 24th opening of the week-
long national lunar New Year’s holiday (which would bring travel by 
millions of people returning home to Wuhan from wherever they 
lived and worked in China, or leaving Wuhan to visit family 
elsewhere).55  If Wuhan officials were to have taken steps that would 
mean the cancellation of the politically high-profile “two meetings” 
or the disruption of travel plans for millions of citizens, it would have 
been a very big, controversial, and possibly panic-triggering move.  
Tellingly, no new cases in Wuhan were publicly reported by official 
sources between January 3 and the conclusion of the municipal 
meetings.56  On the other hand, not making the outbreak known and 
not taking aggressive measures to contain it were risky choices, given 
the prospect that failure to act could seed a much more serious and 
widespread epidemic and, in turn, cause greater damage to the 
economy and public opinion of local government far greater than that 
which would have accompanied the suspension of the political 
meetings and holiday trips.  
Another, broadly kuai-related feature of Chinese governance 
deepens the predicament for local officials:  what might be called the 
“Spider-Man principle”—that “with great power comes great 
 
54 Kyle Jaros, China’s Early COVID-19 Missteps Have an All-Too-Mundane 
Explanation, DIPLOMAT (Apr. 9, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/chinas-
early-covid-19-struggles-have-an-all-too-mundane-explanation/ 
[https://perma.cc/5XNX-34PZ]; Qian Gang, Questions for Hubei’s Delegates, 
CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Feb. 10, 2020), 
https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/02/10/questions-for-hubeis-delegates/ 
[https://perma.cc/E6NM-5YUG]. 
55 Simiao Chen et al., COVID-19 Control in China During Mass Population 
Movements at New Year, 395 LANCET 764, 764 (2020); Josephine Ma and Zhang 
Pinghui, 5 Million Left Wuhan Before Lockdown, 1,000 New Coronavirus Cases 
Expected in City, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 26, 2020, 10:23 p.m.), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3047720/chinese-premier-li-
keqiang-head-coronavirus-crisis-team-outbreak [https://perma.cc/EQ93-WVJ5].  
56 Wuhan Municipal Health Commission, Wuhanshi Weisheng Jiankang Wei 
Guanyu Buming Yuanyin de Bingduxing Feiyan Qingkuang Tongbao (武汉市卫
生健康委关于不明原因的病毒性肺炎情况通报) [Wuhan Municipal Health 
Commission Bulletin Regarding the Novel Coronavirus Infection Pneumonia 
Situation], NAT’L HEALTH COMM’N P.R.C. (Jan. 11, 2020), 
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/xcs/yqtb/202001/1beb46f061704372b7ca41ef3e682229.sh
tml; SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46354, COVID-19 AND CHINA: 
A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (DECEMBER 2019–JANUARY 2020) 9–10, 30 (2020). 
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responsibility.”57  Although four decades of legal and institutional 
reforms have brought extensive retrenchment, the party and the state 
continue to claim and exert great authority over society, with many 
outside analyses concluding that their reach has re-expanded 
significantly during Xi Jinping’s tenure. 58  When something goes 
awry—whether it is a public health crisis, mass harms due to poor 
regulation of tainted food, industrial pollution or construction, or 
even problems that may not stem from failures of regulation or 
governance—party and state staff and institutions at the relevant level 
often are held accountable and suffer the consequences.  They face 
the risk of being seen as responsible in public perceptions and also in 
the judgment of higher-level authorities who “point the spear 
downward” to blame lower-tier officials. 59   Those who serve as 
government or party chiefs—and thus as local “top leaders” 
[yibashou]—for a geographic region are the most vulnerable to this 
phenomenon.60 
 
57 Spider-Man: With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility (2010–2011), 
MARVEL, https://www.marvel.com/comics/series/13532/spider-
man_with_great_power_comes_great_responsibility_2010_-_2011 
[https://perma.cc/K83P-LMUE] (last visited Oct 29, 2020). 
58 See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMM’N ON CHINA, 115TH CONG., 
ANN. REP. 225–33 (2018), 
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/Annual%20Report
%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX65-MS68]; Neil Thomas, Party All the Time: 
Xi Jinping’s Governance Reform Agenda After the Fourth Plenum, MACRO POLO 
(Nov. 14, 2019), https://macropolo.org/analysis/xi-jinping-ccp-china-governance-
reforms-the-fourth-plenum/ [https://perma.cc/T9PT-8UAL]. 
59 See Cheng Li, Think National, Blame Local: Central-Provincial Dynamics in 
the Hu Era, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Winter 2006, at 5 (explaining that 
under Hu, the central government sought to pin blame for crises on local leaders, 
including through promulgation of new regulations); cf. Ran Ran, Understanding 
Blame Politics in China’s Decentralized System of Environmental Governance: 
Actors, Strategies and Context, 231 CHINA Q. 634, 651 (2017) (“Decentralizing 
environmental responsibilities to local governments created a necessary 
prerequisite and allows more space for blaming local officials.”); see also Dan 
Chen, Local Distrust and Regime Support: Sources and Effects of Political Trust 
in China, 70 POL. RSCH. Q. 314, 319 (2017) (“Facing various socioeconomic 
problems and challenges that arise during rapid economic growth and 
urbanization, the central government has allowed mild media criticism on local 
governments and officials and even local protests for the public to vent and let off 
steam of anger and frustration.”). 
60 Minzner, Riots and Cover-ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in 
China, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 53, 121–122 (2009), 
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In the context of the COVID-19 crisis (again echoing 
SARS 61 ), phenomena consistent with this pattern were evident.  
Outside reports blamed local authorities’ fears of the consequences 
of sharing information about the emerging problem with Beijing—
and thus running the risk of being held to blame for the bad news—
for the failure of what was supposed to be the automatic system of 
direct reporting to central public health authorities. 62   By early 
February, Xi Jinping, in a speech to the Politburo Standing 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1115&context=jil 
[https://perma.cc/AHM4-GQHJ]; U.S. CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMM’N ON 
CHINA, Communist Party, State Council Order Stronger Controls Over Society, 
Oct. 4, 2006, https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-
analysis/communist-party-state-council-order-stronger-controls-over-society 
[https://perma.cc/5MPD-S7B3] (The “core leader” (yibashou) at each level of the 
official Chinese party and government hierarchy should personally bear 
responsibility for maintaining social order, and that Chinese officials should 
develop a “correct view of their official achievements.”). 
61 See, e.g., Zhu Xiaochao (朱晓超), Caijing SARS Meizhou Diaocha (财经 SARS
每周调查) [Caijing Weekly Report of SARS], SINA (May 19, 2003, 6:08 PM), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20030519/1808342116.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/4GU2-WBGU] (reporting that 120 local officials were fired or 
reprimanded during the SARS crisis); Jia Yue & Duan Xinyi (贾玥 & 段欣毅), 
Feidian Liuyan Daobi Xinxigongkai Jiakuai Lifa Cuisheng Fayanren Zhidu (非典
流言倒逼信息公开 加快立法催生发言人制度) [Rumors about SARS Forced 
Information Disclosure], RENMIN WANG (人民网) [PEOPLE] (Mar. 25, 2013, 8:52 
AM), http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0325/c1026-20900650-3.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZM9V-46C2] (listing many sanctioned local officials); Sue 
Chan, Beijing Mayor Sacked in SARS Scandal, CBS (Apr. 22, 2003, 7:34 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/beijing-mayor-sacked-in-sars-scandal; 
[https://perma.cc/77MU-J2JJ]; see also Huang, supra note 6, at 124–25 (stating 
that 1,000 government officials were fired for mishandling SARS); Stu Woo, 
China Ousts Senior Officials as Beijing Seeks Distance from Outbreak, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 14, 2020, 8:28 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-ousts-top-
official-in-coronavirus-outbreaks-epicenter-11581568911 
[https://perma.cc/9ZGH-GSNH] (noting that many, primarily lower-ranking 
officials have been fired as a result of the handling of COVID in a way 
reminiscent of the response to SARS).  
62 See, e.g., Myers, supra note 7 (explaining that after SARS, reporting to the 
central authorities was supposed to be “automatic,” but that in Wuhan, local 
health authorities kept Beijing “in the dark” out of fear of sharing bad news); 
Edward Wong et al., Local Officials in China Hid Coronavirus Danger from 
Beijing, U.S. Agencies Find, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/world/asia/china-coronavirus-beijing-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/TU5G-EG8Q]. 
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Committee, pointed to shortcomings by local party, government, and 
public health officials in the initial handling of the outbreak in 
Wuhan.63  Echoing the SARS-era ouster of Beijing Mayor Meng 
Xuenong and lesser officials, the aftermath of the delayed initial 
response to the novel coronavirus outbreak brought the dismissal of 
party chiefs Ma Guoqiang in Wuhan and Jiang Chaoliang in Hubei, 
as well as hundreds of lower-level officials in those jurisdictions and 
in other COVID-hit areas.64  Notably, the pace of firings picked up 
amid rising public outcry over Wuhan authorities having silenced the 
since-deceased Dr. Li.65  
 
63 Xi Jinping (习近平), President, P.R.C., Zai Zhongyangzhengzhiju Changweihui 
Huiyi Yanjiusuo Yingdui Xinxing Guanzhuangbingdu Feiyan Yiqing Gongzuo 
Shi de Jianghua (在中央政治局常委会会议研究应对新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情工
作时的讲话) [Xi’s Speech in the Politburo Standing Committee’s meeting on 
Covid-19 responses], (Feb. 16, 2020) (transcript available at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0216/c64094-31589177.html 
[https://perma.cc/LT9X-MDR3]), §§ 1, 2, 4. 
64 Central-level officials were spared even though some of the fateful delay 
occurred after information about developments in Wuhan had reached higher 
levels.  
65 Xu Tian (徐天), Guanchang “Yiqing Wenze” Guancha; Mianzhi Shi 
Shenmeyang de Wenze Shouduan? (官场“疫情问责”观察 免职是什么样的问责
手段？) [Official “Pandemic Accountability” Observation: What Kind of 
Accountability is Dismissal?], CHINA NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020, 8:44 AM),  
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2020/03-05/9114184.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/2NJW-YCAH7CTC-JXGT] (reporting dismissal of numerous 
government officials); Steven Lee Myers, China Ousts 2 Party Officials amid 
Outrage About Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/world/asia/china-coronavirus-xi-
jinping.htmlhttps://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/world/asia/china-coronavirus-
xi-jinping.html [https://perma.cc/RZ89-39RN] (reporting ouster of Wuhan and 
Hubei Party Secretaries); Qiang Lijing et al., China Penalizes Derelict Officials in 
Coronavirus Fight, XINHUA (Feb. 5, 2020, 12:40 AM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/05/c_138755872.htm. 
[https://perma.cc/SBY6-FWRV]; Willian Zheng, Coronavirus: Beijing Purges 
Communist Party Heads in Hubei Over ‘Botched’ Outbreak Response in 
Provincial Capital of Wuhan, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 13, 
2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3050372/coronavirus-
beijings-purge-over-virus-takes-down-top-communist [https://perma.cc/WPN5-
AWEY]; Swaine, supra note 46 (concerning central authorities’ role in preventing 
release of information to public after they became aware of emerging epidemic in 
Wuhan).  
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Many of these moves could find foundation, or at least 
resonance, in laws and rules providing for demotions, firings, civil, 
and criminal punishment for local governments (as well as public 
health institutions), the officials who staff them, or others (including 
those not holding government posts) who failed to perform, or 
performed badly, their duties in responding to potential or actual 
outbreaks of infectious diseases, epidemics or public health 
emergencies.66  
Tiao and Fragmented/Ambiguous Governance 
During SARS, the sacking of officials deemed at fault for a 
flawed response (most prominently, Minster of Health Zhang 
Wenkang) reflected difficulties that extended to the functionally 
differentiated, central-government-unit-led, tiao side of governance. 
67  Although such high-level figures did not fall in 2020 (possibly 
because the centrally directed response came sooner and was more 
effective than in 2003), here, too, the SARS experience loosely 
foreshadowed analogous issues during the initial response to 
COVID-19.  Officials at lower levels in the public health and disease 
control and prevention bureaucracy were among those disciplined or 
fired after the problematic initial handling of the novel coronavirus 
outbreak.68  Some of the tiao-side problems were the obverse of the 
kuai-side issues discussed above, but others involved more distinctly 
tiao-side attributes.  
These features include aspects of what is often called China’s 
“fragmented authoritarianism”69—a system of governance in which 
 
66 See Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, arts. 63, 67–68; Infectious 
Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 65–68; Regulations on Responses, supra note 
31, arts. 45, 47, 49. 
67 Mark Oliver, China Sacks Minister over Sars, GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2003, 8:06 
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/20/sars.markoliver 
[https://perma.cc/E9AG-M7U2] (reporting that China’s health minister was fired 
over the mishandling of SARS). 
68 Erin Mendell, China Fires Highest-Level Officials Yet Over Coronavirus 
Oubreak, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-fires-
highest-level-officials-yet-over-coronavirus-outbreak-11581447269 
[https://perma.cc/7J97-4PKM] (reporting firing of Party Secretary and Director of 
Hubei Provincial Health Commission). 
69 See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, The “Fragmented Authoritarianism” Model and Its 
Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO 
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the institutional building blocks (both bureaucratic/vertical and 
geographic/horizontal) often function as highly discrete actors, with 
independent and conflicting interests and agendas, that battle and 
bargain in a largely political process to shape regime policies and 
priorities.  To be sure, coexisting governmental or political 
institutions that are “siloed” from one another are near-universal 
problems, 70  but the challenges have been distinctive and highly 
salient in China.  This fragmentation entails several interlinked 
features, and all of them were evident in the early reaction to COVID-
19. 
First, members—and especially leaders—of governmental 
organs tend to identify with their own institutions (such as ministries 
and similar bodies at the central level, or provincial and lower-level 
governments and party organs), and view counterparts in other units 
as outsiders.  This identification with the unit, or danwei, is often 
 
CHINA, supra note 28, at 6–12, 20–25 (setting forth a “fragmented 
authoritarianism” model for Chinese policy-making); David M. Lampton, A Plum 
for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China, in 
BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA, supra 
note 28, at 33; Andrew Mertha, “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”: Political 
Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process, 200 CHINA Q. 995, 996–997, 1012 
(2009) (assessing applicability of fragmented authoritarianism model in more 
recent period and noting opportunities it creates for policy entrepreneurs, 
particularly in water resource policy); Yanzhong Huang, The State of China’s 
State Apparatus, 28 ASIAN PERSP. 31, 55–59 (2004) (describing “bureaucratic 
fragmentation” as a problem for regulatory policy-making and coordination in 
China, including in the public health sector); see also Yu Xiaohong & Yang Hui (
于晓虹  & 杨惠), Dangzheng Tizhi Chonggou Shiyu xia Zhengfa 
Gongzuo Tuijin Luoji de Zaishenshi (党政体制重构视阈下政法工作推进
逻辑的再审视) [Reexamining the Logic of Advancing Political-Legal Work from 
the Perspective of Reconstructing the Party-Government System], ZHONGGUO 
SHEHUIKEXUE WANG (中国社会科学网) [CHINESE SOC. SCI. NET] (July 21, 2019, 
09:26 AM), http://www.cssn.cn/fx/202007/t20200721_5158007_2.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/8NFQ-97NY] (describing party-focused efforts to overcome 
fragmentation among government institutions in the Xi era). 
70 See, e.g., B. Guy Peters, The Challenge of Policy Coordination, 1 POL’Y 
DESIGN & PRAC. 1, 4–5 (2018) (pointing to factors including specialization, 
information-hoarding, and ignorance of collective goals as explanations for the 
“persistence of . . . ‘silos’ and ‘stove pipes’ that exist in most governments”); 
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (describing administrative 
procedures as means to address the principal-agent problem between political 
leaders and bureaucratic institutions). 
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robust, notwithstanding the pull of “dual rule” on sub-national-level 
officials staffing branches of ministry-headed bureaucracies that also 
are parts of local governments.  Very often, kuai dominates tiao in 
the orientation and behavior of such officials, especially when legal 
and policy mandates do not clearly give one priority over the other. 
These dynamics appear to have been at work in the initial 
response to COVID-19 in Wuhan and Hubei.  Many of the roles that 
the relevant laws assign in addressing potential epidemics are 
allocated in overlapping ways to the tiao-side public health and 
disease control and prevention bureaucracies and to the kuai-side 
local governments (often in their supervisory capacity over local 
health commissions and infectious disease control and prevention 
institutions).  By assigning key roles in monitoring, reporting, 
informing the public, and responding to disease outbreaks to 
provincial or local-level health commissions and disease control and 
prevention institutions, the laws encourage (or at least do not 
discourage) the tendency for such organs to align with their same-
level governments more than their higher-level bureaucratic 
superiors.71   
These features are consistent with significant aspects of the 
early reaction to COVID-19, including:  the pattern of failure by key 
actors in the public health system who were part of, or accountable 
to, Wuhan authorities to follow faithfully the Direct Reporting 
System and the requirements that it and other rules imposed to report 
immediately to central public health authorities (a pattern that 
included moves by those authorities to impose narrow diagnostic 
criteria and to require official approval for reporting); 72  and the 
obstruction undertaken by many of those same actors and the 
resulting frustration experienced by the investigative teams 
dispatched to Wuhan by higher-level authorities in the NHC- and 
CDC-led public health system.  According to accounts from 
participants in Wuhan, use of, and compliance with, the direct 
reporting system (and prompt reporting more generally) were 
effectively impeded by local officials and the hospital leaders who 
 
71 See Peters, supra note 70; McCubbins, supra note 70. 
72 Both the Infectious Disease Law and rules concerning Direct Reporting System 
outline specific instances which would trigger mandatory reporting requirements.  
See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 30–38; Measures for Information 
Reporting, supra note 36. 
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answered to them. 73   According to a report based on leaked 
documents from Wuhan, the average time between onset of 
symptoms and confirmed (and, thus, reportable) diagnosis exceeded 
three weeks into early March.74  The difficulties encountered by the 
investigative teams also reflect a second type of tiao-side problem. 
Second, the relative strength and status of government units—
and, thus, the rules they implement—matter a great deal in China’s 
fragmented system.  The public health/infectious disease institutions 
(xitong—system—in the argot of Chinese governance) are 
comparatively weak actors in China’s complex bureaucratic politics.  
In the official hierarchy of Chinese governance, the CDC is a ting—
a sub-ministry-level entity under the NHC, and the NHC is the 
equivalent of a ministry.  The NHC’s director has the rank of 
buzhang—minister—and thus is formally a peer of the heads of 
twenty-five other ministries and commissions of the central 
government and broadly on par with a provincial governor (such as 
the governor of Hubei).   
Formal status is only part of the story in Chinese politics.  The 
public health bureaucracy has been a troubled system, going through 
multiple recent restructurings, from the Ministry of Health (which 
was the target of much criticism after SARS), to the National Health 
and Family Planning Commission in 2013 (which encompassed 
responsibilities for China’s long-fraught and contentious population 
control programs), to the current National Health Commission in 
2018 (less than two years before the outbreak of COVID-19).  
Throughout, the national public health bureaucracy has not been 
headed by officials with the political prominence (or super-
ministerial ranks, such as State Councilor) possessed by the heads of 
some major ministries or commissions that deal with perennially 
high-priority matters such as economics or national security. 
Senior public health experts and officials had long 
complained that public health policy was generally not a high priority 
for policy makers, that its importance was not understood by leaders 
or by the public, and that the CDC’s powers were extremely limited.  
They drew unfavorable contrasts with the United States’ CDC, which 
they characterized as well-funded and highly respected (before the 
reputational damage wrought by the Trump administration’s handling 
 
73 See supra discussion and sources accompanying note 43. 
74 See Walsh, supra note 5.  
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of COVID-19) and reporting directly to the White House.  Some also 
were distressed by moves at local levels in China that reportedly 
merged CDC branches into other government units, thereby 
undermining upward reporting and accountability to the national-
level CDC and further strengthening the tendency for kuai to 
overshadow tiao.75 
Concerns about weaknesses in the state’s public health and 
disease control system—its lack of capacity and clout, which had 
been blamed for shortcomings in handling SARS—had spurred 
reforms to strengthen and centralize the bureaucratic apparatus. 76  
 
75 Jeremy Page & Lingling Wei, China’s CDC, Built to Stop Pandemics Like 
COVID, Stumbled When It Mattered Most, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2020, 10:30 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-cdc-built-to-stop-pandemics-stumbled-
when-it-mattered-most-11597675108 [https://perma.cc/7VVK-HA9X]; Ye 
Shuisong (叶水送), Guojia Jikongzhongxin Qianzhuren Li Liming: Yihou Guonei 
Gonggongweisheng Tixi Ruhe Gaige? (国家疾控中心前主任李立明：疫后国内
公共卫生体系如何改革？) [Former Director of CDC Li Liming: How to Reform 
National Public Health System after the Pandemic?] (Chen Xiaoxue (陈晓雪) 
ed.), ZHISHIFENZI (知识分子) (May 19, 2020), 
http://www.zhishifenzi.com/depth/depth/9051.html [https://perma.cc/R9GK-
7Q79]; Zhang Ranran (张冉燃), Gongongweisheng Shouxian Yao Xing Gong (公
共卫生首先要姓公), XINHUA (May 11, 2020, 9:40 AM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/local/2020-05/11/c_1125967825.htm 
[https://perma.cc/YG7P-GKA3]; see also Cheng Jinquan (程锦泉), Woguo Jibing 
Yufangkongzhi Tixi Xiandaihua Jianshe de Sikao ji Duice Jianyi (我国疾病预防
控制体系现代化建设的思考及对策建议) [Thought and Suggestions on Modern 
Construction of Disease Prevention and Control System], 54 CHINESE J. 
PREVENTIVE MED. (中华预防医学杂志) 475, 476, (May 6, 2020), 
http://rs.yiigle.com/CN112150202005/1194071.htm (concerning the “extremely 
limited” powers of CDC). 
Admiring comparisons were to the U.S. CDC predated the Trump 
administration’s moves to marginalize its influence and undermine its 
independence, insulation from politics, and adherence to norms of science-based 
assessments and recommendations.  See Martha Kinsella et al., Trump 
Administration Abuses Thwart Pandemic Response, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
(Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/trump-
administration-abuses-thwart-us-pandemic-response [https://perma.cc/Y7S7-
3RWJ]; Lena H. Sun & Joel Achenbach, CDC’s Credibility is Eroded by Internal 
Blunders and External Attacks as Coronavirus Vaccine Campaign Looms, WASH. 
POST (Sep. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/09/28/cdc-
under-attack/ [https://perma.cc/5R8S-4D88].  
76 See supra discussion accompanying note 7, of the principal laws and 
regulations, all of which were adopted or revised significantly after SARS; David 
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But such reforms did not greatly transform the landscape of power 
and resources.  For example, CDC leadership still pressed criticisms 
that after the post-SARS-reforms, the CDC was still short on 
resources, low in morale, and lacking the authority to issue directly 
early warnings about disease outbreaks to local hospitals and the 
public, to make policy, or to enforce pandemic-related laws 
(including by imposing administrative sanctions).77   
The problem of a relatively weak national public health 
bureaucracy is hardly unique to China.  But it is more pronounced in 
a system that puts a high emphasis on economic performance.  This 
priority could be set aside—and in the context of COVID-19 to some 
 
Hipgrave, Communicable Disease Control in China: From Mao to Now, J. GLOB. 
HEALTH (Dec. 2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3484775/ 
[https://perma.cc/EAK9-D8M4] (praising centralization within and greater 
attention to CDC and improvements to laws governing infectious diseases after 
SARS); Chengyue Li et al., The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
System in China: Trends from 2002–2012, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2093, 2101 
(2016) (“China’s CDC System has shown remarkable improvements in resource 
allocation and service delivery.”). 
77 See Lilia Wu & Evelyn Cheng, Virus Disclosure in China Was Delayed 
Because Disease Control Group Lacks Authority, Top Scientist Says, CNBC (Feb. 
28, 2020, 7:38 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/28/chinas-cdc-lacks-
authority-to-alert-public-on-virus-scientist-says.html [https://perma.cc/E69Y-
AU7Z] (reporting on “budget cuts and talent losses” at the CDC); Li Liming (李
立明) et al., Yiqing Zaoqi, Jibing Yufang Kongzhi Tixi Shisheng Yuanyin Hezai? 
(疫情早期，疾病预防控制体系失声原因何在？) [At the Early Stage of 
Pandemic, Why Was the Disease Prevention and Control System Slient?], 
ZHISHIFENZI (知识分子) (Mar. 3, 2020), 
http://zhishifenzi.com/depth/depth/8392.html [https://perma.cc/QTW7-FKMZ] 
(describing CDC as a technical institution without supervisory or law 
enforcement powers or adequate resources, according to CDC Director); Cheng, 
supra note 75 (describing CDC’s lack of authority to  disclose information to the 
public, make policy, and exercise powers of enforcement/administrative 
punishment); Sidney Leng, China’s Coronavirus Response Slowed by 
Bureaucracy, Unstable Funding as Government Never Empowered Lower Level 
Officials, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 9, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3073960/chinas-
coronavirus-response-slowed-bureaucracy-unstable [https://perma.cc/RJ5E-
WPBE] (noting CDC lacked authority to issue an early warning to hospitals).  See 
also Fan Jiang et al., Towards Evidence-Based Public Health Policy in China, 
381 LANCET 1962, 1963 (2013) (“By contrast with evidence-based medicine, 
which is mainly practised at the grassroots level, mindset change from opinion-
based to evidence-based decision making can start from the top. Administrative 
officials could exert their influence downward to accelerate the transition.”). 
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extent it was, at least briefly—under exceptional circumstances, such 
as an economy-shaking severe public health crisis.  But such focus-
shifting circumstances tend to arise or become evident—as they did 
in the COVID-19 pandemic—only after it is too late to address 
shortcomings in time to avoid a crisis and its adverse economic 
consequences. 
The early days of COVID-19 reflected the continued relative 
lack of stature and power of China’s public health and disease-
response institutions.  Leaked documents lament the Hubei provincial 
center for disease control and prevention’s lack of funding, capacity 
and staff morale on the eve of COVID-19, and criticize local branches 
for not having played a leading, rather than merely passive, role in 
the early phases of the epidemic.78  Despite features in the legal and 
regulatory framework that envisaged greater reliance on central 
public health and infectious disease institutions and their expertise, 
the 2004 revisions to the Infectious Disease Law and other laws did 
not raise the then-new Direct Reporting System to the status of law, 
nor—at least in the eyes of critics—did they establish sufficiently 
clear legal thresholds or duties for direct reporting.  Because the 
infectious disease and outbreak reporting system was geared to 
already-identified diseases and COVID-19 was a new disease, the 
law left local actors greater latitude in not immediately reporting the 
novel virus (until central authorities issued a specific directive on 
reporting requirements and application of the highest-level, Class A 
protocols for the novel coronavirus in late January). 79   By not 
adequately directing medical staff to bypass superiors, the monitoring, 
reporting, and investigation framework was left at greater risk of 
being undermined by the type of obstructionism by local authorities 
and hospital leadership that occurred in Wuhan. 80   Resort to the 
 
78 Walsh, supra note 5 (quoting Hubei CDC report and other leaked documents). 
79 See Wang Xixin (王锡锌), Chuanranbing Yiqing Xinxi Gongkai de Zhang’ai ji 
Kefu (传染病疫情信息公开的障碍及克服) [The Obstacles for Information 
Disclosure in Infectious Disease Pandemics and the Ways to Overcome the 
Obstacles], FAXUE (Mar. 28, 2020), 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/raqY4vNJmKz2UCHTEQgpZg 
[https://perma.cc/8KRZ-NGYG]. 
80 Relevant laws and regulations direct medical personnel to make reports through 
their hospitals or through local-level disease control and prevention institutions—
which are the local branch of the CDC and, as discussed above, are part of 
notably weak central institutions and have been greatly subordinated to, or even 
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Direct Reporting System was also undermined by medical 
personnel’s poor understanding of the reporting procedure, the costs 
to them (in terms of resources and distraction from the urgent task of 
treating patients) of filling out reports, and doubts about whether 
cases fit the uncertain and shifting criteria for reporting, in an 
environment where the importance of the Direct Reporting System 
had not been emphasized.81  These features collectively gave local 
officials in Wuhan responsible for public health more room, and 
reasons, to shirk tiao-side obligations and to opt for the side of the 
“double or nothing bet” that entailed eschewing the Direct Reporting 
System and not cooperating with the expert teams sent out under the 
auspices of the NHC.82 
Some of the most striking—yet archetypical—testimony 
about relative institutional weakness comes from those frustrated 
agents of public health units whom higher-level authorities 
dispatched during the early weeks of the outbreak to the viral 
epicenter in Wuhan, where they encountered such potent resistance 
from those associated with the units of local governance.  As Dr. 
Zhong—the leader of the third and crucial investigative delegation—
put it, what happened in Wuhan exposed the “shortcomings” of a 
system in which the “CDC’s position” was “too low” as a mere 
“technical department” that could “only report upward” and “level by 
 
absorbed into other, local-level government organs.  Infectious Disease Law, 
supra note 32, art. 30–38;  Measures for Information Reporting, supra note 36, 
art. 16–20;  National Implementation Plan, supra note 38, §§ 3–4, 6; Wuhan 
Yiqing, supra note 40.  See also Edward Gu & Lantian Li, Crippled Community 
Governance and Suppressed Scientific/Professional Communities: A Critical 
Assessment of Failed Early Warning for the COVID-19 Outbreak in China, 5 
J.CHINESE GOVERNANCE 160 (2020), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23812346.2020.1740468 
[https://perma.cc/9C6B-6YGT] (arguing that the lack of autonomy among 
scientific and professional communities, including doctors, and the dominance of 
the epidemic governance system by local “bureaucratic forces,” contributed to the 
“failed early warning” of the COVID-19 outbreak). 
81 See Shen Kui (沈岿), Lun Tufa Chuanranbing Xinxi Fabu de Falü Shezhi (论突
发传染病信息发布的法律设置) [On the Legal Settings of the Information 
Release of Emergent Infectious Diseases], DANGDAI FAXUE (当代法学) 
[CONTEMP. L. REV.], no.4, 2020, at 27, 31–32, (describing the lack of competent 
public health experts at local level and medical personnel’s lack of understanding 
of the Reporting System). 
82 For a detailed account of the non-activation or avoidance of the Direct 
Reporting System, see Yang, supra note 13. 
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level”—an arrangement that was contemplated by relevant 
regulations (including those governing public health emergencies), 
and that meant slower response times (especially compared to what 
the Direct Reporting System was designed to achieve), and more 
influence for geography-based government units (kuai) relative to the 
CDC-NHC (tiao) structure. 83   Zhong elaborated, “Except for 
reporting to upper levels of authorities, the CDC has no power to 
make any decision for the next move.”84  In the words of an expert in 
the second NHC delegation, they “were not allowed to step in” 
because “territorial management” was mandated (by the Infectious 
Disease Law, among other things), and the expert group’s role was 
“only” to “offer some help.”85  As noted earlier, the relative weakness 
of the CDC and NHC structures also made the delegations 
problematically dependent on Wuhan local authorities (and those 
who answered primarily to them), and thus vulnerable to being 
hamstrung by recalcitrant responses and non-disclosure. 
This is not to say that the tiao side was entirely marginalized 
during the early weeks of responding to the novel coronavirus.  
According to an official timeline and other sources, some information 
about the outbreak had reached the NHC (including through the end-
of-December leaks of the WHC documents) and prompted some 
measures in early and mid-January, including a reported NHC 
directive to health organizations not to make public reports and to 
impose narrow diagnostic criteria, the establishment of a COVID-
focused leading group within the NHC, the creation of guidelines on 
early detection, diagnosis, quarantine, prevention, and control, and 
the dispatch of the three successive expert delegations to Wuhan and 
more than a half-dozen investigative teams to other locations.86   
While these actions might strengthen arguments for assigning 
to national public health institutions some of the responsibility for 
 
83 Wuhan Yiqing, supra note 40; Yang, supra note 1310; Regulations on 
Responses, supra note 31, art. 20. 
84 Wu & Cheng, supra note 77.  
85 Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 30. 
86 STATE COUNCIL INFO. OF. P.R.C., supra note 14, § I.  On the order not to report 
publicly, see Gao Yu et al., supra note 47; Myers, supra note 7; on diagnostic 
criteria, see Walsh, supra note 5. 
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shortcomings in the initial response,87 their relatively limited—and in 
some cases critically delayed—moves also reflect those institutions’ 
limited roles and powers, especially when measured against the 
ambitious aims that motivated the adoption of the Direct Reporting 
System and other post-SARS reforms to the legal and regulatory 
framework for handling infectious diseases and public health 
emergencies.  Notably, the shift to a more effective response to the 
COVID-19 crisis followed intervention by central authorities above 
the level of the NHC and CDC, including Xi Jinping, Premier Li 
Keqiang, the State Council and an ad hoc top-level party group 
established to focus on the pandemic (and with NHC head Ma’s 
initial national teleconference purporting to relay instructions from 
Xi, Li, and Vice Premier Sun Chunlan.88 
Third, the institutional fragmentation of Chinese governance 
also means that officials often operate in an environment of ambiguity 
born of legal and policy mandates, from multiple sources, that 
sometimes do not clearly delineate functions and responsibilities.  
This can mean significant difficulties for effective governance, all the 
more so given other characteristics of the Chinese system addressed 
elsewhere in this article.  In principle, China’s legal system does 
provide for a hierarchy of sources of law, ranging from the 
constitution to laws adopted by the National People’s Congress or its 
Standing Committee, to administrative regulations promulgated by 
the State Council, to rules issued by subnational-level legislative 
bodies and central government ministries and commissions, to 
normative documents that do not have the full formal force of law, 
and so on.  In principle, lower level rules must be consistent with 
higher-level rules to be valid.  In practice, the situation is a good deal 
messier. 89   Lower-level rules are sometimes amended without 
 
87 See Swaine, supra note 46 (assigning partial responsibility—and more than 
what is assigned in many analyses of the initial phase of COVID-19—for early 
shortcomings to central authorities). 
88 These issues are addressed more fully infra note 139; see also NAT’L HEALTH 
COMM’N P.R.C., supra note 19. 
89 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华人民共和国立法法) 
[Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, rev’d Mar. 15, 2015, effective Mar. 15, 2015),  
arts. 78–86, CLI.1.245693(EN) (Lawinfochina); Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal 
System with Chinese Characteristics, 24 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 47–49 
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corresponding changes to higher-level sources of law.  Officials often 
regard the most specific, sometimes formally lower-ranking source 
as the most relevant or dispositive.  Meta-rules to resolve, or even 
discern, conflicts among primary rules are not very systematic, 
coherent, or robust in governmental (or even much legal) thinking.90  
Processes to provide definitive interpretations of, or resolution of 
conflicts among, rules are relatively weak or informal.  Powers of 
judicial review do not extend formally to the authority to strike down 
laws or regulations for non-conformity with higher laws, and 
legislative exercises of powers of oversight and review of lower-tier 
sources of law are rare and weak in practice. 91   Diverse or 
inconsistent rules from entities of equal rank within China’s 
fragmented and siloed state often can be resolved effectively only 
through intervention (often of a legally informal type) by higher 
levels (often at the level of the “common superior” of the contending 
institutions).92 
 
(2010); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD THE RULE OF 
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90 See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 
(Anders Wedberg trans., 1945) (concerning the importance of higher-level norms 
for determining the validity of more specific, lower-level norms). 
91 See Shen Kui, Administrative “Self-Regulation” and the Rule of Administrative 
Law in China, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 73 (2018); He Haibo, How Much Progress 
Can Legislation Bring? The 2014 Amendment of the Administrative Litigation 
Law of PRC, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 137 (2018). 
92 See Donald C. Clarke, Peter Murrell and Susan Whiting, The Role of Law in 
China’s Economic Development in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
(Loren Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2008) 376–379, 414 (concerning the 
need to resort to a “common superior” to resolve, often informally, disputes 
among agents, primarily in economic contexts); Shirk, The Chinese Political 
System and the Political Strategy of Economic Reform, in BUREAUCRACY, 
POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA, supra note 28, at 59, 62, 
72–75, 86–87 (concerning the dispersion of authority to make policies and rules 
among discrete units); John K. Yasuda, China’s Rigid Governance System Means 
Local Health Problems Can Easily Go National, WASH. POST, (Feb. 3, 2020, 6:00 
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/03/chinas-rigid-
governance-system-means-local-health-problems-can-easily-go-national/ 
[https://perma.cc/T7MZ-F8HF] (describing challenges of coordination on a vast 
scale across multiple government institutions with different governance processes 
as impediment to responding to COVID-19 and other health crises). 
As is addressed later in this article, these attributes within the realm of 
formal laws and regulations are compounded by their coexistence with directives, 
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One aspect of the phenomenon of multiple, and collectively 
ambiguous, rules may be reflected in a notorious incident from the 
initial response to COVID-19.  Facing criticism for not informing the 
public during the early weeks of the growing epidemic, Wuhan 
Mayor Zhou Xianwang—who also headed the city’s Novel 
Coronavirus Infection Control and Prevention Headquarters—
explained that he had delayed releasing information because “as a 
local government, I can only disclose information . . . after I have 
received authorization.”93  If sincere, the mayor’s position adopts a 
plausible but problematic construction of relevant law.  Provisions in 
the Infectious Disease Law give the NHC responsibility for issuing 
warnings and releasing information to the public about outbreaks or 
epidemics (and potential outbreaks and epidemics).  The same law 
and relevant regulations contemplate provincial-level HCs receiving 
specific NHC authorization to release information about such 
developments to the public. 94   The NHC’s authorization for 
 
in some cases issued by organs of the Communist Party—sometimes jointly with 
state bodies—and, still-more-informal sources and uses of political power. 
93 Zhang Yuting (张雨亭), Wuhan Shizhang Cheng Wuquan Gongbu Yiqing? (武
汉市长称无权公布疫情？) [Municipal of Wuhan Claiming No Right to Make 
Public the Pandemic], NANFANG DUSHI BAO (南方都市报) [S. METROPOLIS 
DAILY]: SOHU (搜狐) (Jan. 30, 2020, 9:36 PM), 
https://www.sohu.com/a/369630319_161795 [https://perma.cc/43FF-DFHU] (“As 
a local government, I can only disclose information . . . after I have received 
authorization.”); Langlang (郎朗) et al., Wuhan Shizhang Chengren Qianqi Xinxi 
Pilu Bujishi (武汉市长承认前期信息披露不及时) [Municipal of Wuhan 
Admitted Untimely Disclosure of Information at the Early Stage], SINA (Jan. 27, 
2020, 3:49 PM), https://news.sina.cn/gn/2020-01-27/detail-
iihnzhha4917463.d.html [https://perma.cc/46JG-26G6]; Wuhan Chengli Xinxing 
Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Zhihui Bu (武汉成立新型
冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情防控指挥部) [Wuhan Establishes Novel Coronavirus 
Infection Pneumonia Prevention and Control Command Center], XINHUA (Jan. 
21, 2020) http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-01/21/c_1125487978.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TE2A-3M8X]; see also Zhao Hong (赵宏), “Weijing Shouquan 
Bude Pilu” Beihou de Xinxi Gongkai Zhidu yu Wenti (“未经授权不得披露”背后
的信息公开制度与问题) [Information Disclosure System and Problem Behind 
“No Unauthorized Information Disclosure”], PENGPAI (澎湃) [THE PAPER] (Jan. 
31, 2020, 2:27 PM), https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_5700131 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ5J-JQJJ] (discussing whether the Wuhan Mayor’s position on 
disclosure has legal justification). 
94 Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 19, 38; Regulations on Responses, 
supra note 31, art. 25; Measures for Information Reporting, supra note 36, art. 32. 
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provincial-level HCs to release information has been granted, on a 
general, not case-by-case, basis.95  None of that would have legally 
required, or authorized, Zhou—as a sub-provincial-level leader—to 
make a public announcement about the emerging epidemic.  Yet, the 
Emergency Response Law authorizes local people’s governments 
(such as the one in Wuhan headed by Zhou) to issue an early public 
warning and provide the public with information and guidance about 
an imminent public health emergency, so long as such actions are 
consistent with relevant statutes and regulations.96   
If the mayor’s statement is disingenuous, it shows the 
potential for an official to exploit regulatory ambiguity and adopt 
self-serving readings of law in an effort to shirk responsibility or shift 
blame.  This can be a tempting, and sometimes effective, defensive 
move for an official who has erred in wagering that he or she could 
contain an escalating problem—such as the COVID-19 outbreak—
without attracting game-changing attention from higher levels.   
Another example of the consequences of collectively 
ambiguous rules in China’s fragmented governance may be in the 
delayed reporting of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan.  The Direct 
Reporting System called for rapid direct reporting to central CDC 
authorities of potentially dangerous infectious disease outbreaks of 
uncertain origin, and relevant rules called for use of the Direct 
Reporting System.  But those rules also left room for the use of 
“report cards” to be submitted through alternate channels, particularly 
for entities that had not yet adopted or were not authorized to use the 
Direct Reporting System.  Although the rules called for speedy 
transmission through such channels, they relied in part on a structure 
that was more dependent on level-by-level, geographic-unit based 
reporting.97  That more kuai-leaning structure remained embedded in 
 
95 Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 42–45, 53; Infectious Disease 
Law, supra note 32, art. 19, 38; Weishengbu Fading Chuanranbing Yiqing he 
Tufa Gonggong Weisheng Shijian Xinxi Fabu de Fangan (卫生部法定传染病疫
情和突发公共卫生事件信息发布的方案) [Ministry of Health Plan for Public 
Release of Information Concerning Statutory Infectious Diseases and Public 
Health Emergencies) (promulgated by Ministry of Health, Mar. 3, 2006, effective 
Mar. 3, 2006), § 1, CLI.4.76664 (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Plan for Public 
Release of Information]. 
96 Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 42–45. 
97 Measures for Information Reporting, supra note 36, art. 18–19; National 
Implementation Plan, supra note 38, § 3 (2004); Weishengbu Guanyu Yinfa 
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more general, formally higher-level laws and regulations that also 
governed reporting on such outbreaks.98   
In the circumstances of COVID-19’s emergence, both sets of 
rules arguably applied (as did other legal requirements concerning 
reporting).  Critical reports indicate that, in a move of questionable 
legal propriety, local authorities in Wuhan opted, during the crucial 
early weeks of January, not to have medical staff follow the Direct 
Reporting System and—at best—to apply the less demanding 
alternatives for providing timely information to central authorities.  
Those alternatives allowed for “consultations” at local levels that 
could delay reporting, and had an imprecise and therefore malleable 
definition of cases of pneumonia that required urgent and direct 
reporting.99  Reported directives from the NHC and provincial and 
lower-level public health authorities to apply narrow standards for 
defining reportable cases further muddied the waters by adding 
specific, if formally lower-tier, measures undermining direct 
reporting mandates.100   
The effects of indeterminate sets of legal rules and fragmented 
government institutions are compounded by the role played by the 
Chinese Communist Party and its rules.  The party famously—and, 
in the Chinese system, legitimately—penetrates and guides state 
 
“Quanguo Bumingyuanyinfeiyan Bingli Jiance, Paicha he Guanli Fangan” de 
Tongzhi (卫生部关于印发《全国不明原因肺炎病例监测、排查和管理方案》
的通知) [Ministry of Health Notification on Publishing the “National 
Implementation Plan for Surveillance, Investigation, and Management of 
Pneumonia Cases of Unknown Etiology”] (promulgated by Ministry of Health, 
May 10, 2007, effective May 10, 2007). 
98 See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 30–38; Regulations on 
Responses, supra note 31, art. 20. 
99 Wei, supra note 40 (describing various issues with the reporting system); Yang, 
supra note 13, (describing non-use of Direct Reporting System and issues with 
local authorities’ actions under the Implementation Plan and its related 
Investigation and Management Plan); Hu Shanlian (胡善联), Yi Kuaisu Zhucheng 
de Chuanranbing Zhibao Xitong, Zheci Biaoxian Ruhe? (以快速著称的传染病
直报系统，这次表现如何？) [Known for Its Rapidity, How did the Direct 
Reporting System Perform This Time?], GUANCHAZHE (观察者) (Mar. 5, 2020, 
7:52 AM), https://www.guancha.cn/hushanlian/2020_03_05_539943.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/CH6D-JH7C] (assessing performance of the reporting system, 
finding slowness in initial response to COVID-19). 
100 See supra discussion accompanying note 38. 
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institutions.101  The many government officials and staff who are also 
party members are formally subject to party, as well as state, rules 
and disciplinary procedures.  One example of such rules relevant to 
the response to COVID-19 is the Xi-era “Regulations of the 
Communist Party of China on Requests for Instructions and Reports 
on Major Issues,” which require reporting to higher levels in the party 
on implementation of policies and seeking instructions from higher 
levels on a broad and open-ended range of “major matters,” including 
major diseases (and then following higher-level instructions). 102  
Another example is the COVID-specific Party Central Committee 
“Notice on Strengthening the Party’s Leadership and Providing a 
Strong Political Guarantee for Winning the War of Prevention and 
Control of the Epidemic,” which foregoes regulation-like directives 
but generally exhorts party committees and members to take 
leadership roles in COVID response work by government agencies 
and public health departments, as well as in mobilizing non-state 
actors.103  
The non-law character of party rules and directives does not 
make them clearly or consistently less significant than state laws and 
policies in influencing matters of governance, such as responding to 
 
101 See, e.g., CHENG LI, CHINA’S COMMUNIST PARTY-STATE: THE STRUCTURE 
AND DYNAMICS OF POWER, in POLITICS IN CHINA 192, 193–94 (William A. 
Joseph ed., 2d ed. 2014) (“In a very real sense, the institutions of party and state 
are intimately intertwined [in China] . . . . ”); Tony Saich, GOVERNANCE AND 
POLITICS OF CHINA, 109–115 (4th ed. 2015) (describing the role of CCP in  
China’s political system). 
102 Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Requests for Instructions and 
Reports on Major Issues, XINHUA (Apr. 19, 2019), 
http://lnupd.com/english/article/shows/269 [https://perma.cc/UXA4-LLP8]; 
Zhonggongzhongyang Yinfa “Guanyu Jianqiang Dang de Lingdao, Wei Daying 
Yiqing Fangkong Zujizhan Tigong Jianqiang Zhengzhi Baozheng de Tongzhi” (中
共中央印发“关于加强党的领导、为打赢疫情防控阻击战提供坚强政治保证
的通知”) [Communist Party of China Central Committee “Notice on 
Strengthening the Party’s Leadership and Providing a Strong Political Guarantee 
for Winning the War of Prevention and Control of the Epidemic”], ZONGHUA 
RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG RENMIN ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人
民政府) [THE STATE COUNS. PRC] (Jan. 28, 2020, 6: 57 PM), 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-01/28/content_5472753.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S8KY-V6Q9] [hereinafter Notice]; see also; Xi, supra note 63 
(describing the Central Committee Notice). 
103 Notice, supra note 102.  
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COVID-19.  In the Chinese political hierarchy, party secretaries have 
power and, often, responsibilities greater than those of mayors at the 
city level and governors at the provincial level.  Although earlier 
periods during the Reform Era emphasized separating party and 
government functions, during Xi’s tenure, the role of the party and its 
leadership over government have re-expanded (a point reflected, and 
stressed, in the Central Committee’s COVID-19 Notice). 104  
Tellingly, in the wake of the troubled initial response to the novel 
coronavirus outbreak, the most prominent dismissals mainly targeted 
the incumbents of party, rather than government, posts.105 
Fourth and finally, fragmentation of authority means that 
coordination among siloed institutions is necessary for effective 
government action, but such coordination can be difficult to achieve, 
especially in contexts like the COVID-19 outbreak.  Despite post-
SARS reforms, responsibility for public health issues remained 
spread across numerous central and local government organs.106  In 
Wuhan during the initial COVID-19 outbreak, a monitoring system 
 
104 Christopher K. Johnson & Scott Kennedy, China's Un-Separation of Powers, 
FOREIGN AFF. (July 24, 2015), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-24/chinas-un-separation-
powers [https://perma.cc/4ZRF-X4AV]; Jamie P. Horsley, Party Leadership and 
Rule of Law in the Xi Jinping Era, BROOKINGS (Sept. 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/party-leadership-and-rule-of-law-in-the-xi-
jinping-era/ [https://perma.cc/FA58-4NSA]. 
105 See Xu, supra note 65 (reporting dismissal of numerous party secretaries in 
different institutions); Woo, supra note 61 (reporting the firing of “two top 
Communist Party officials in Hubei province” as a result of their mishandling of 
the early response to COVID-19); Chao Deng, China Fires Official After New 
Coronavirus Cases Emerge in Wuhan Community, WALL. ST. J. (May 11, 2020, 
10:49 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-fires-official-after-new-
coronavirus-cases-emerge-in-wuhan-community-11589205412 
[https://perma.cc/6FVH-GGQH] (reporting on the firing of a party secretary in 
charge of a Wuhan residential complex in which new COVID cases emerged). 
106 See generally Alex Jingwei He, Manoeuvring within a Fragmented 
Bureaucracy: Policy Entrepreneurship in China's Local Healthcare Reform, 236 
THE CHINA Q. 1088, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-
quarterly/article/manoeuvring-within-a-fragmented-bureaucracy-policy-
entrepreneurship-in-chinas-local-healthcare-
reform/514362ABACFED5EFBCC3DF0A4D8EF78E [https://perma.cc/GVV4-
8ATH]; Alex Jingwei He, Is the Chinese Health Bureaucracy Incapable of 
Leading Healthcare Reforms?: The Case of Fujian Province, 10 CHINA: INT’L J., 
no. 1, https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-330679069/is-the-chinese-
health-bureaucracy-incapable-of-leading [https://perma.cc/7FZ2-DWET]. 
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that was premised on active engagement and cooperation among 
hospital administrators, the local public health authorities, other units 
of local governance, and central public health authorities failed—
“monumentally,” in the words of one expert observer. 107   A full 
response (beyond detection and reporting) to an epidemic would 
require coordination with still more state entities.     
Here, the problem is compounded by China’s version of a 
widespread and common problem of governance:  the relatively low 
importance generally accorded to public health policy and 
preparedness.  Unless or until a disease outbreak or other issue has 
become a major crisis (or appears to be on track to do so), the 
concerns that are within the ambit of the public health and disease 
control institutions are overshadowed by other matters, such as the 
economy or social order.  Those issues are within the immediate and 
primary responsibilities of other xitong headed by more powerful 
central government entities, and are in ordinary times higher 
priorities for omnicompetent local leaders such as governors, mayors, 
or party secretaries.108  Concerns about triggering public panic—and 
thus putting at risk high-priority goals of maintaining social order and 
 
107 Dali L. Yang, China’s Early Warning System Didn’t Work on Covid-19. 
Here’s the Story., WASH. POST, (Feb. 24, 2020, 5:13 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/24/chinas-early-warning-
system-didnt-work-covid-19-heres-story [https://perma.cc/77TF-4WKT] (“The 
infectious diseases sentinel system only works if the hospitals and local health 
administrations actively engage with it and contribute to the information. In 
Wuhan, the system failed, monumentally.”); see also Myers, supra note 7 
(describing the failure of the Chinese government’s “alarm system” to contain the 
outbreak of the Coronavirus). 
108 See, e.g., Yijia Jing et al., The Politics of Performance Measurement in China, 
34 POL’Y & SOC’Y 49, 49–61 (2017) (listing economic performance and social 
order and related goals as still-important criteria among and increasingly complex 
set of criteria); Yongshun Cai & Lin Zhu, Disciplining Local Officials in China: 
The Case of Conflict Management, 70 CHINA J. 98, 109–103 (2013) (finding that 
discipline system for officials create incentives  to focus on issues affecting social 
stability and/or regime legitimacy); Pierre F. Landry et al., Does Performance 
Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder, 
51 COMP. POL. STUD. 1074, 1078–1081 (2018) (finding competence in achieving 
economic performance, along with political connections to be keys to 
advancement for cadres in China); Susan Whiting, The Cadre Evaluation System 
at the Grass Roots, in HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER 104–112 (Cambridge, 2004) 
(describing central role of local economic performance in system for evaluating 
and promoting local leaders). 
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promoting economic activity—reportedly motivated Wuhan officials’ 
initial delay in fulfilling their public health-related duties of reporting 
on the emerging disease outbreak or taking steps that would have 
signaled to the public the existence of a serious threat posed by the 
novel coronavirus.109 
Signals from the top leadership to lower-level officials about 
the persisting primacy of concerns with the economy and stability 
quickly reemerged once the worst phase of the COVID-19 crisis had 
passed.  In March and April 2020, a series of speeches by Xi Jinping 
and directives from the party’s COVID-focused leading small group 
and others began to emphasize reopening the economy, while in some 
cases also noting the need for continued attention to social order 
(something that might be helped by lifting the strict, often discontent-
promoting restrictions imposed to check the spread of the disease).110  
In April, the Supreme People’s Court declared that a priority in 
handling civil lawsuits and other judicial work would be to minimize 
the pandemic’s economic consequences.  The court’s directive called 
for, for example, a narrow reading of transaction-disrupting force 
majeure claims in contracts, and a flexible approach to requests for 
property preservation in litigation (which would protect the interests 
of pandemic-imperiled defendant small businesses.)111  To be sure, 
 
109 Jun Mai, Politics May Have Stalled Information in Wuhan Coronavirus Crisis, 
Scientist Says, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 30, 2020, 8:45 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3048283/politics-may-have-
stalled-information-wuhan-coronavirus-crisis [https://perma.cc/4HVH-2E2D]; 
Tom Hancock, Coronavirus Makes for Dismal Lunar New Year for Wuhan 
Residents, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/975d8fbc-3fed-
11ea-bdb5-169ba7be433d [https://perma.cc/YXM8-QNWY] (reporting “tense 
atmosphere” and censored calls for ousting local leaders after epidemic belatedly 
disclosed); Xi, supra note 63 (repeatedly emphasizing importance of maintaining 
social stability in responding to COVID-19 and as a key element of successful 
epidemic response). 
The tension is hardly limited to COVID-19.  See Dali L. Yang, China’s 
Troubled Quest for Order: Leadership, Organization and the Contradictions of 
the Stability Maintenance Regime, 26 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 35 (2017); Anthony 
Giddens, Risk and Responsibility, 62 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1999) (politics “marked by 
the push-and-pull between accusations of scaremongering on the one hand and 
cover-ups on the other”). 
110 See generally STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. P.R.C., supra note 14, at § II.4. 
111 Sun Hang (孙航), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi Fuze Ren jiu Chutai Yifa 
Tuoshan Shenli She Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Minshi Anjian Ruogan Wenti de 
Zhidao Yijian (Yi): Da  Jizhe Wen (最高人民法院研究室负责人就出台依法妥
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pushes to return to economic normalcy and worries about the 
unpopularity of lockdowns and other restrictions quickly emerged in 
many COVID-stricken countries, but the pivot taken in China’s 
response to COVID-19 was particularly striking and telling, given 
China’s especially high and long-running pre-COVID emphasis on 
economic growth and stability issues, the severity of the COVID-
related restrictions that had been imposed in much of China, and the 
relative insulation of the Chinese regime from public political 
pressure.  
Centralization of power has long been a principal method for 
addressing the challenges born of fragmentation in China’s 
governance, and centralization has been a major trend in politics and 
governance during the Xi era.  Somewhat paradoxically, however, 
centralization of power can exacerbate the problem of lower-level 
officials shirking responsibilities—a major problem for the effective 
performance of tasks such as responding to a fast-moving disease 
outbreak.  In a more centralized system, lower-level officials have 
incentives to:  be passive and adopt wait-and-see attitudes (because 
they expect directives to come from above and are reluctant to act in 
the absence of such directives); favor nonfeasance over possible 
malfeasance (because malfeasance may be, other things being equal, 
more likely to be detected and sanctioned by watchful superiors); and 
eschew aggressive or proactive measures to address major issues 
(unless and until the top-level leaders issue the decisions or send the 
signals that come from on high in a centralized system).112   
 
善审理 涉新冠肺炎疫情民事案件若干问题的指导意见（一）:答记者问) 
[Supreme People’s Court Research Office Issues Guidance on the New 
Coronavirus Epidemic—Answering Reporters’ Questions], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. 
(Apr. 20, 2020, 10:41 AM), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-
226251.html [https://perma.cc/L64J-V6DX]. 
112 On the problem of “shirking,” see, e.g., Ni Xing & Wang Rui (倪星 & 王锐), 
Quanze Fenli yu Jiceng Bize: Yizhong Lilun Jieshi (权责分立与基层避责：一种
理论解释) [Separation of Power and Responsibilities: A Theoretical 
Explanation], ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE (中国社会科学) [CHINA SOC. SCI.], no. 
5, 2018, at 116, 
http://sociology.cssn.cn/xscg/zxwz/201809/W020180917437129089398.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F4WX-MDRM] (arguing that the separation of power and 
responsibility and the loss of power by local governments leads to shirking); Yan 
Jirong (燕继荣), Guanyuan “Lanzheng” Buzuowei Xianxiang Shenceng Yuanyin 
Fenxi (官员“懒政”不作为现象深层原因分析), ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG 
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Xi’s first public statement concerning the virus on January 20 
was such a signal.  It was followed by assertions that Xi had been 
fully in charge of directing the epidemic response form an early date, 
including through instructions issued at a Politburo Standing 
Committee meeting on January 7. 113   Although surely meant to 
indicate attention and direction from the top in a self-consciously 
centralized system, the claim had a problematic political side-effect.  
It prompted skepticism about its veracity, and—if the claim were 
accepted as true—questions about why an informed and capable top 
leadership had not moved more swiftly to mobilize a full-fledged 
response to the emerging epidemic.114 
 
XINWEN WANG (中国共产党新闻网) [CPC NEWS] (May 26, 2015, 2:45 PM), 
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0526/c112851-27059033.html 
[https://perma.cc/3UBP-DWP3] (analyzing the reasons for shirking by local 
government officials in China’s government system).  
On the centralization of power under Xi Jinping, see Sangkuk Lee, An 
Institutional Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power, 26 J. CONTEMP. 
CHINA 325, 326 (2017) (examining Xi Jinping’s centralization of political power); 
Kjeld Erik Bordsgaard, China’s Political Order under Xi Jinping: Concepts and 
Perspectives, 16 CHINA: AN INT’L. J. 1, 14–18 (2018) (arguing that power has 
been centralized and party authority over the state has increased under Xi and 
noting contrast with the less top-heavy, less hierarchically organized, and less 
Leninist order earlier in the reform era under Deng Xiaoping). 
113 Xi, supra note 63 (stating that Xi issued instructions on control and prevention 
of the epidemic at a January 7 Politburo Standing Committee meeting and special 
instructions on January 20); see also STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. PRC, supra note 
14, at § II.1 (providing official timeline of events). 
114 See, e.g., Amy Qin, China’s Leader, Under Fire, Says He Led Coronavirus 
Fight Early On, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/15/world/asia/xi-china-coronavirus.html 
[https://perma.cc/AZ2V-QRRH] (examining the backlash that resulted from 
statements of Xi Jinping); Chun Han Wong, Beijing Portrays President Xi 
Jinping as Hero of Coronavirus Fight, WALL ST. J. ( Mar. 8, 2020, 10:34 AM),  
https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-portrays-president-as-hero-of-coronavirus-
fight-11583678054 [https://perma.cc/CK2Q-KWFR] (examining how Chinese 
authorities presented Xi Jinping’s efforts to contain the spread of coronavirus); 
Wong et al., supra note 62 (describing assessments of implications of whether Xi 
and top leadership knew of epidemic at earliest phases or learned only later 
because of local officials’ concealment); Opinion, What Did Xi Jinping Know 
About the Coronavirus, and When Did He Know It?, WASH. POST, ( Feb. 19, 
2020, 6:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-
opinions/what-did-xi-jinping-know-about-the-coronavirus-and-when-did-he-
know-it/2020/02/19/35482fe2-5340-11ea-b119-4faabac6674f_story.html 
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STRENGTHS OF THE SYSTEM: MOBILIZING TO 
CONTAIN THE EPIDEMIC 
Once centrally mandated efforts to contain COVID-19 began, 
they were formidable and effective—as well as draconian.  Success 
was achieved through the regime’s extraordinary ability to mobilize 
people and resources on a massive, national scale. 115   Tens of 
thousands of medical personnel and large stores of equipment 
(including PPE from rapidly ramped-up production) were dispatched 
to Wuhan, and elsewhere in Hubei, including through a system that 
paired supplier provinces with recipient Hubei cities.  Basic, 
temporary hospitals were constructed within two weeks after the 
lockdown was imposed. 116   Teams composed of, or under the 
direction of, government staff were dispatched within neighborhoods 
and apartment blocks to conduct health checks, provide daily 
necessities, impose isolation and quarantine, erect barriers, and 
conduct contact tracing.  Special fangcang—shelter—hospitals were 
 
(discussing the potential timeline of when Xi Jinping became aware of the 
coronavirus). 
115 For an overall account of these responses, see STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. 
PRC, supra note 14, §§ III.3–III.4. 
116 See Chai Minyi (柴敏懿), Quanguo Gong Pai 4.2 Wan Yihurenyuan Zhiyuan 
Wuhan, Qizhong Hushi 2.86 Wan Ming (全国共派 4.2 万医护人员支援武汉，
其中护士 2.86 万名) [A Total of 42,000 Medical Personnel were Sent to Support 
Wuhan, including 28,600 Nurses], PEOPLE’S DAILY; PENGPAI (澎湃) [THE PAPER] 
(Feb. 29, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_6236796 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ6X-787Y] (“A total of 42,000 medical personnel were sent to 
support Wuhan, including 28,600 nurses”); China Mobilizes Medical Teams to 
Fight New Coronavirus, XINHUA (Jan. 24, 2020, 10:28 PM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/24/c_138731835.htm 
[https://perma.cc/DAP8-ZDXS] (describing dispatch of medical teams and rapid 
hospital construction); Wen Jicong & Deng Hao (温济聪 & 邓浩), Pingfan 
Yingxiong, Wuxian Rongguang—Ji Wuhan Huoshenshan, Leishenshan Yiyuan de 
Jianshezhe he Weihuzhe Men (平凡英雄，无限荣光—记武汉火神山、雷神山
医院的建设者和维保者们) [On the Heroic Actions by Workers Who Constructed 
the Temporary Hospitals in Wuhan], XINHUA (Apr. 6, 2020, 12:16:42 PM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-04/06/c_1125818508.htm 
[https://perma.cc/CS93-QBWN] (describing rapid hospital construction); Alex 
Jingwei He et al., Crisis Governance, Chinese Style: Distinctive Features of 
China’s Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic, 3 POL’Y DESIGN & PRAC. 242, 249–
250 (2020) (describing provincial “pairings” with Hubei cities as resource 
mobilization method). 
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established to remove not-seriously-ill patients from the general 
population.117  Similar methods were employed in other hotspots, 
including Beijing. 118   In terms of funds expended and economic 
activity foregone, the cost of these undertakings was very high. 
By early March, Chinese authorities declared the outbreak in 
Wuhan and Hubei “curbed,” and an easing of travel bans and other 
restrictions on activities soon followed.”119  By the end of November 
2020, the reported death toll nationwide was under 5000 and the 
official number of cases was under 100,000, with consistently low 
new case rates after early March and infection and death rates very 
far below global averages.120  China’s statistics have met with some 
skepticism abroad.  Undercounting COVID-19 infections and 
fatalities has been a problem in many countries.121  But critics have 
 
117 See sources cited supra note 26 on travel restrictions.  Simiao Chen et al, 
Fangcang Shelter Hospitals:A Novel Concept for Responding to Public Health 
Emergencies, 395 LANCET 1305, 1305–306 (2020) (describing the creation of 
shelter hospitals). 
118 See, e.g., Gerry Shih, Locked Down in Beijing, I Watched China Beat Back the 
Coronavirus, WASH. POST (Mar 16, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/locked-down-in-beijing-i-
watched-china-beat-back-the-coronavirus/2020/03/16/f839d686-6727-11ea-b199-
3a9799c54512_story.html [https://perma.cc/6PCR-J6WR]; Shi Jingtao, Beijing 
and Shanghai Impose New Controls on Residents as China Battles to Contain 
Coronavirus, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 10, 2020), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3049891/beijing-and-shanghai-
impose-new-controls-residents-china-battles [https://perma.cc/YX2J-BZ3U].  
119 Stephen McDonell, Coronavirus: China Says Disease ‘Curbed’ in Wuhan and 
Hubei, BBC, (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
51813876 [https://perma.cc/Q3XK-JXBR] (describing comments by Xi Jinping 
that the virus was “basically curbed in Wuhan and Hubei); STATE COUNCIL INFO. 
OFF. PRC, supra note 14, §§ I.2–I.3; China Publishes Timeline on COVID-19, 
supra note 19. 
120 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY CORONAVIRUS RESOURCE CENTER, 
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/china [https://perma.cc/TZ2P-ABKY] (last 
vistied Dec. 8, 2020); Covid World Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/coronavirus-maps.html 
[https://perma.cc/W293-CFL8]. 
121 Daniel Michaels, Extent of Covid-19 Deaths Failed to be Captured by Most 
Countries, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/most-
countries-fail-to-capture-extent-of-covid-19-deaths-11590658200 
[https://perma.cc/7FZ2-DWET] (reporting undercounting of cases and deaths in 
many countries, including U.S. and China); Raffaele Vardavas, Courtney A. 
Gidengil & Sarah A. Nowak, Estimates of COVID-19’s Fatality Rate Might 
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argued that China seriously understated the damage that COVID-19 
wrought in Wuhan and elsewhere (a view partly borne out by leaked 
documents and an official upward revision of early counts)—
especially concerning deaths during the early weeks of the 
epidemic—and have challenged the accuracy of China’s reported 
COVID statistics more generally.122  As illustrated by the June 2020 
outbreak in a Beijing wholesale food market, cases in Qingdao a few 
months later (prompting a massive, city-wide testing initiative), and 
resurgence of case counts in many other places around the world 
where the virus had seemed under control, success can be 
precarious.123  Notwithstanding these caveats and doubts, China’s 
 
Change. And Then Change Again, RAND BLOG (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/03/estimates-of-covid-19s-fatality-rate-might-
change-and.html [https://perma.cc/UY5L-TJ28] (infection cases undercounted 
globally, leading to overestimate of case fatality rate). 
122 See, e.g., Amy Qin, China Raises Coronavirus Death Toll by 50% in Wuhan, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/world/asia/china-wuhan-coronavirus-death-
toll.html [https://perma.cc/V8NM-7TEQ] (discussing the lack of full transparency 
by the Chinese government regarding Coronavirus death tolls); Walsh, supra note 
5 (presenting leaked documents indicating February 10 case count was two times 
official report’s tally); Elaine Okanyene Nsoesie et al., Analysis of Hospital 
Traffic and Search Engine Data in Wuhan China Indicates Early Disease Activity 
in the Fall of 2019, HARV. LIBR. OFF. SCHOLARLY COMMC’N (2020), 
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/42669767/Satellite_Images_Baidu_C
OVID19_manuscript_DASH.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y 
[https://perma.cc/FUC5-8ASB] 3–5; Charlie Campbell & Amy Gunia, China Says 
It's Beating Coronavirus. But Can We Believe Its Numbers?, TIME (Apr. 1, 2020, 
8:54 AM), https://time.com/5813628/china-coronavirus-statistics-wuhan/ 
[https://perma.cc/KM7R-MZPW]; Julian E. Barnes, C.I.A. Hunts for Authentic 
Virus Totals in China, Dismissing Government Tallies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/us/politics/cia-coronavirus-
china.html [https://perma.cc/97MZ-E75D] (expressing or describing skepticism 
about China’s representations regarding its containment of the virus). 
123 See Anna Fifield & Lyric Li, Beijing Goes Into ‘Wartime Mode’ as virus 
emerges at market, WASH. POST (June 13, 2020, 3:08 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/beijing-goes-into-wartime-mode-as-
virus-emerges-at-market-in-chinese-capital/2020/06/13/65c5aac8-ad40-11ea-
868b-93d63cd833b2_story.html [https://perma.cc/H6BU-ZUYH]; China’s 
Qingdao Tests 11 Million after Local COVID-19 Cases Emerge, XINHUA (Oct. 
15, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-10/15/c_139442983.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7HCE-YFHF]; Andrew Witty and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, 
Resurgence of Covid-19 in Many Countries Underscores How Vulnerable Billions 
of People Are, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 3, 2020), 
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containment efforts were notably successful by international 
standards and severe recurrences have been avoided into the final 
months of 2020.   
China’s legal framework for responding to public health 
emergencies and infectious disease outbreaks reflects an appreciation 
of what is needed to handle the daunting challenges of governance 
that COVID-19 and similar threats pose.  Although too often evaded 
or less than zealously followed in the initial phases of the pandemic, 
the laws and rules that called for energetic monitoring, reporting, and 
investigating still were part of the story behind taking the necessary 
first steps toward—and the subsequent unfolding of—the large-scale, 
center-driven response.  Some aspects of making the outbreak known 
to higher-level public health authorities, conducting on-the-ground 
investigations, and informing the public paralleled what the laws 
contemplated (although sometimes belatedly and grudgingly, to the 
frustration of many, including the expert teams sent to Wuhan and 
higher-level authorities)  And departures from legal requirements 
were criticized and sometimes sanctioned. 124   Many of the more 
dramatic moves undertaken in Wuhan and elsewhere in late January 
and early February tracked provisions in laws authorizing the 
imposition of isolation and quarantine, suspension of travel, 
addressing and eliminating animal sources of human disease 
outbreaks, provision of medical and other support and assistance, and 
so on.125   
The ability to direct vast state and societal, human and 
material, resources to pursue the regime’s high-priority goals—as 
occurred in Wuhan and elsewhere in China during the COVID-19 
 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/10/03/resurgence-covid-19-many-
countries-underscores-vulnerable-billions/ [https://perma.cc/GN6E-3KMB]. 
124 See supra discussion accompanying note 119.  See also generally STATE 
COUNCIL INFO. OFF. P.R.C., supra note 14, §§ I.2–I.3.  
125 See, e.g., Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 20, 40, 42–45 
(authorizing relevant level people’s government to undertake necessary 
prevention and control measures, including but not limited to isolating potential 
sources of infection, suspending economic and social activities and transportation 
in and out of affected areas, eliminating animal sources of disease); Emergency 
Response Law, supra note 29, arts. 45, 49 (authorizing relevant level people’s 
government to muster and deploy resources, shutdown places and activities, and 
take other necessary prevention, control, and protection measures in the event of 
Level 1 or 2 emergency, and to provide treatment, control sources of danger, and 
isolate dangerous sites and areas in the event of a public health incident). 
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crisis—reflects strengths of Chinese governance and China’s 
administrative state, despite the weaknesses evident in the early 
response to the novel coronavirus outbreak. 126  China has, in the 
parlance of comparative politics, a highly capable state, with 
institutions robust enough to govern society, manage politics, and 
extract and deploy resources effectively.127  The regime’s formidable 
capacity derives in part from a system of one-party authoritarian rule, 
a preeminent leader, an in-principle unitary state, and mutually 
reinforcing party and state structures of top-down hierarchical 
authority and discipline.128  
 
126 Yanzhong Huang, China’s Public Health Response to the COVID-19 
Outbreak, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.prcleader.org/huang [https://perma.cc/B5QP-ANAY];  
Emma Graham-Harrison & Lily Kuo, China's coronavirus lockdown strategy: 
brutal but effective, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2020, 1:07 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/19/chinas-coronavirus-lockdown-
strategy-brutal-but-effective [https://perma.cc/C4NU-FVMH]; He et al, supra 
note 116 (analyzing Chinese regime’s mobilizational capacities and methods in 
crisis conditions).  But cf. Yasheng Huang, No, Autocracies Aren't Better for 
Public Health, B. REV. (Apr. 14, 2020), http://bostonreview.net/politics-global-
justice/yasheng-huang-no-autocracies-arent-better-public-health 
[https://perma.cc/EG3R-2S4S] (arguing that the autocratic elements in China’s 
response to COVID-19 have hindered efforts to contain the virus and make the 
situation worse). 
127 For the classic statement of the importance of state capacity to political order 
and regime success, see  SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN 
CHANGING SOCIETIES 1 (1968) (“The most important political distinction among 
countries is not their form of government but their degree of government.”). On 
China as a capable state, see, e.g., DALI L. YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE 
LEVIATHAN (2004) (analyzing success of government institutional reforms as 
means to sustained growth, political stability, and addressing corruption); World 
Governance Indicators, 2018, WORLD BANK, 
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators [https://perma.cc/EG5D-NF4W] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020) (ranking 
China at 71.6th percentile globally on “government effectiveness” and at 42.8th 
percentile on “regulatory quality”).  
128 See generally HUNTINGTON, supra note 127, 335–343 (characterizing 
communist and Leninist systems as highly institutionalized and therefore 
politically effective); PHILIP SELZNICK, THE ORGANIZATIONAL WEAPON 1–16 
(1952) (characterizing Leninist structures as an effective “organizational 
weapon”); see also Jacques deLisle, Law in the China Model 2.0: Legality, 
Developmentalism and Leninism under Xi Jinping, 26 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 66, 
75–76, 79 (2017) (concerning Leninist features of law in China during Xi era). 
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For China, success in containing the coronavirus (as in 
pursuing many other difficult policy priorities) depended on—among 
other things—overcoming the challenges of fragmentation and the 
difficulties of implementation on a mammoth scale.  Moves to 
suppress COVID-19 in Wuhan, Beijing, and elsewhere (in areas with 
a population in the hundreds of millions) and measures to prevent the 
disease’s further spread and recurrence necessarily relied on many 
actions—and, in many cases, coordinated actions—by numerous 
organs of the Chinese state.  These included the NHC and CDC, 
health commissions and disease control and prevention institutions at 
various levels, other public health-related government departments, 
public security forces, the Ministry of Transportation (which 
collaborated with the NHC and three other government departments 
on the “Notice” to prevent transmission of COVID over 
transportation networks), local public transport agencies (to limit 
access and enforce safety policies on subways and buses), public 
works crews (to build physical barriers), the Ministry of Commerce 
(to help address supply issues), the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (for big data and AI tracking measures), the 
People’s Liberation Army (to help build temporary hospitals and 
provide supplemental medical staff), the Ministry of Education (to 
extend school closures beyond the New Year’s holiday, on the orders 
of the State Council, and to institute coronavirus screening and 
prevention measures in schools), party committees at many levels (to 
exhort people and monitor their behavior), and many others.   
From formal laws to more ad hoc measures, an emphasis on 
creating and using wide-ranging and cross-sectoral mobilizational 
capacity is notably pervasive in epidemic and public health-related 
contexts.129  The most extraordinary legal provisions (for example, 
formally declaring a constitutional “state of emergency”) were not 
invoked amid the novel coronavirus outbreak.  Short of such 
measures, the Emergency Response Law—adopted partly to 
implement lessons from SARS—and the Infectious Disease Law—
also revised in the wake of SARS—and other laws explicitly 
contemplate a whole-of-government (and whole-of-society) 
mobilizational response to public health crises, especially where—as 
 
129 For an argument that the effective response (after the initial missteps) reflects 
specifically the strengths in crisis management of the Chinese system, see Swaine, 
supra note 46. 
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occurred with COVID-19—the highest sub-constitutional level of 
emergency (Level 1) and the most serious level of infectious disease-
fighting measures (Class A restrictions) are invoked. 130   The 
acknowledgement of the importance of coordinating across often-
fragmented units of governance is explicit in such legal provisions.  
They set forth the authority of the State Council and provincial and 
local governments—as coordinating organs—to require the 
mobilization of state and social resources, and the duties of 
government units across many functional systems, party-state-linked 
residents’ committees, and ordinary citizens and enterprises to 
cooperate with such mobilization directives and other government-
led responses to infectious disease outbreaks or public health 
emergencies.131  Therein lies a broad, law-embodied imperative for 
 
130 See Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 69 (stating that National 
People’s Congress Standing Committee and State Council have the authority to 
declare a “state of emergency” as contemplated in the Constitution); see also 
deLisle, supra note 8, at 352–56 (discussing distinction between constitutional 
state of emergency and lesser forms of emergency response in Chinese law and in 
the formulation of the Emergency Response Law).  
131 See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 6, 9, 39, 45, 49 (setting forth: 
the obligation of departments other than NHC—and their local branches—to 
undertake disease control and prevention work within their scope of work; the 
obligation of residents’ committees and villagers committee to participate in 
disease control and prevention work; obligations of hospitals and medical 
institutions in combatting epidemics; the State Council’s and provincial and local 
government’s authority to mobilize people, deploy state resources, and requisition 
private resources in response to a serious infectious disease outbreak; and the 
obligations of producers of essential medical supplies and transportation 
services—many of which are government entities—to give priority to work 
needed for addressing epidemics); Provisions on Disease Control, supra note 7, 
art. 3–4 (emphasizing the principles of “integrated resources” [zhenghe ziyuan] 
and “clear allocation of [coordinated] responsibilities” [mingque zhize], and 
noting the roles of multiple relevant agencies [youguan bumen] in addressing 
infectious disease challenges).  See also Emergency Response Law, supra note 
29, art. 6, 8, 12, 14, 32, 48–49, 52, 55, 57 (providing that: the state shall establish 
social mobilization mechanisms; the State Council or provincial and local 
governments shall coordinate and direct responses to emergencies; the PLA shall 
participate in emergency response efforts; the state shall secure material and 
agreements with enterprises to provide material to address possible emergencies; 
the people’s governments shall organize relevant departments and deploy state 
and social emergency resources to respond to emergencies, including public 
health emergencies; the people’s governments have authority to requisition 
property; and residents’ committees and villagers’ committees are obligated to 
organize and mobilize citizens and maintain order in emergencies; citizens are 
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the coordinating and mobilizational strengths that were on display in 
the active phase of the Chinese state response to COVID-19.   
Top-level coordination efforts, often invoking formal legal 
authority, figured prominently in the response to COVID-19.  As the 
centrally mandated response began in earnest around January 20, 
under the direction of Premier Li and the State Council, the National 
Health Commission declared that the novel coronavirus was a Class 
B disease under the Infectious Disease Law, and triggered the stricter 
measures that the law provided for Class A diseases.  This move 
appears to have been consistent with the Infectious Disease Law 
provisions that contemplate applying Class A measures to specified 
Class B diseases (such as SARS, to which COVID-19 was closely 
related) and other infectious disease outbreaks of unknown cause for 
which the State Council determines Class A-style measures are 
warranted.132  A month later, as central authorities moved to adjust 
 
required to obey and assist the government and residents’ committees and 
villagers’ committees); Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, art. 3, 32–34, 
38, 40 (establishing the obligation of departments of transportation to assure 
timely delivery of needed medical materials in emergency; ad hoc 
“headquarters/command bodies” authority to mobilize and deploy people and 
material, and to exercise power of requisition; the obligation of transportation 
operators to cooperate isolating infectious passengers; and the obligation of 
residents’ committees and villagers’ committees to assist public health authorities 
and other government authorities to address public health emergencies).  
132 Sun Meng (孙梦), Jiefeng Zaiji, Li Lanjuan Shouci Pilu Wuhan Fengcheng 
Xijie (解封在即，李兰娟首次披露武汉封城细节) [In the End of Lockdown in 
Wuhan, Li Lanjuan Disclosed Details of Implementation of the Lockdown for the 
First Time], ZHONGGUO YILIAO (中国医疗) [MED.CHINA.COM.CN] (Mar. 27, 
2020, 10:17 PM), http://med.china.com.cn/content/pid/167168/tid/1023 
[https://perma.cc/Z3EZ-R5EQ]; Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 3–4, 
39.  Reports attributed the announcement to the State Council itself, whereas the 
Infectious Disease Law contemplates announcement by the NHC after approval 
by the State Council of a recommendation from the NHC.  The formal 
Announcement was issued by the NHC, with a statement that it was approved by 
the State Council, as contemplated under the law.  Guojia Weisheng Jiankangwei 
Huitong Xiangguan Bumen Lianfang Liankong Quanli Yingdui Xinxing 
Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing (国家卫生健康委会同相关部门
联防联控 全力应对新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情) [National Health 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China and Relevant Departments Joint 
Prevention and Control Mechanism: All-Out Efforts to Combat COVID-19 
Epidemic], STATE COUNCIL P.R.C.(Jan. 21, 2020), 
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/yjb/s7860/202001/d9570f3a52614113ae0093df51509684.
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measures to the evolving challenges, a formal Notice on Further 
Differentiated, Region-Specific, and Tiered Control and Prevention 
was issued pursuant to the State Council’s capacious regulatory 
authority to address epidemics and public health emergencies—a 
pattern broadly paralleled by lower-tier state units in their roles in an 
“all hands” response.133   
In an early February speech to the Politburo Standing 
Committee, Xi asserted the importance of a law-based approach to 
epidemic control and prevention, calling for increased public 
attention and adherence to the Infectious Disease Law and other laws, 
and for using the law to punish officials’ dereliction of duty, and any 
criminal activities that impeded the pandemic response or took 
advantage of pandemic conditions. 134   In that speech and other 
remarks, Xi argued that it was important to pursue pandemic 
prevention and control “according to law” and to “follow the path of 
the rule of law” in such work.135  The State Council White Paper 
recounting the first months of the response to COVID-19 stated, 
without details, that the Infectious Disease Law and implementing 
measures had been “strictly followed,” reported that the authorities 
had addressed incidents of fraud and other crimes committed in 
connection with trade in PPE and other matters, and asserted, rather 
obliquely, that “legal disputes associated with the epidemic” had been 
“resolved in accordance with law.”136   
 
shtml; Announcement of the National Health Commission of the People's 
Republic of China, 2020 No.1, supra note 23. 
133 See, e.g., the Notice issued jointly by the NHC, the Ministry of Transportation, 
and three other government units discussed earlier in this subsection. 
134 Xi Stresses Law-based Infection Prevention, Control, XINHUA (Feb. 5, 2020), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/05/c_138758782.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9TBQ-7GNG]; Xi, supra note 63. 
135 Xi Jinping, Quanmian tigao yifa fang kong yifa zhili nengli, jianquan guojia 
gonggong weisheng yingji guanli tixi (全面提高依法防控依法治理能力,健全国
家公共卫生应急管理体系) [Comprehensively Improving Law-Based Epidemic 
Prevention and Control and the National Public Health Emergency Management 
System], QIUSHI (求是) [CPC CENT. COMM. BIMONTHLY] (May 2020), 
http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-02/29/c_1125641632.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S3J9-4HSM] (reprinting several Xi speeches from February).  
136 STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. PRC, supra note 14, § II; see also Regulations on 
Responses, supra note 31, art. 52 (concerning criminal penalties for offenses in 
the context of public health emergency). 
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To address the COVID-19 epidemic, the Chinese leadership 
also turned to other organizational fixes that long had been in the 
repertoire of governance for addressing urgent problems.  New 
bodies were established by late January with responsibilities for 
overseeing, coordinating, and steering the response across otherwise 
possibly fractious or sluggish units.  One major example was the State 
Council’s Joint Control and Prevention Mechanism.  With a 
leadership role for Vice Premier Sun Chunlan (whose preexisting 
portfolio included oversight responsibility for the NHC), it was 
charged with coordinating across thirty-two specified sectors.  This 
approach was reprised at lower levels in Wuhan and other localities, 
where novel coronavirus epidemic control and prevention emergency 
headquarters were set up.137  Such arrangements, too, resonated with 
relevant laws’ mandates for establishing task-specific “headquarters” 
or “command bodies” [zhihui bu/zhihui jigou] under the State 
Council or lower-level governments to respond to public health 
emergencies, including serious infectious disease outbreaks.138 
Another key example was the establishment of a party-based 
“leading small group” [lingdao xiaozu].  One of many such subject 
matter-based elite ad hoc entities created during Xi’s tenure (and 
echoing a similar move undertaken in the 2003 response to SARS, 
but with a lessened role for public health experts), the Central 
Leading Small Group for Work to Counter the New Coronavirus 
Epidemic was announced immediately after the lockdown began in 
 
137 STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. PRC, supra note 14, § II.1; STATE COUNCIL PRC, 
supra note 132; Yan Ning et al., China's Model to Combat the COVID-19 
Epidemic: A Public Health Emergency Governance Approach, 5 GLOB. HEALTH 
RSCH. & POL’Y. (July 14, 2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7358318/ 
[https://perma.cc/TM72-77V3].  On the operation of the Wuhan headquarters, see 
Anna Fifield & Lena H. Sun, Travel Ban Goes Into Effect in Chinese City of 
Wuhan as Authorities Try to Stop Coronavirus Spread, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 
2020, 11:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/nine-dead-
as-chinese-coronavirus-spreads-despite-efforts-to-contain-
it/2020/01/22/1eaade72-3c6d-11ea-afe2-090eb37b60b1_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y5HB-NPX3]. 
138 See Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, art. 8 (authorizing ad hoc 
headquarters/command body under State Council and lower-level governments to 
handle responses to emergencies); Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, art. 
3 (specifying State Council’s “headquarters” or “command body” roles in 
responding to public health emergency). 
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Wuhan and was chaired by Premier Li Keqiang—who, as the head of 
the State Council, also oversaw the Joint Control and Prevention 
Mechanism, manifesting the close integration of party and 
government authority at the top levels of the Chinese system.139  A 
leading small group was established within the central NHC structure 
as well.  Throughout, Xi and others among the top leadership 
repeatedly stressed the importance of following rules and directives 
issued on behalf of central party and state authorities. 
At times, the response to COVID also resonated with other, 
more heavily political and less institutionalized means that were often 
employed in an earlier time in the history of the P.R.C.  Although the 
Reform Era that began in 1978 brought a sharp turn away from the 
“campaign” mode of governance that characterized the Mao era and 
some of its most disruptive excesses, the notion of pursuing a heroic 
fight against an abstract enemy echoed, albeit faintly, in the fight 
against epidemic diseases in the first decades of the twenty-first 
century.140  During SARS, China’s then-top leader Hu Jintao spoke 
of an unrelenting “people’s war” by “the whole nation” under “strong 
and correct” party leadership against the viral enemy. 141   Such 
 
139 Wen-Hsun Tsai & Wang Zhou, Integrated Fragmentation and the Role of 
Leading Small Groups in Chinese Politics, 82 CHINA J. 1, 1 (2019) (discussing 
how leading small groups operate to “integrat[e] the interests 
and opinions of various government and Party departments”); Li Keqiang, 
Premier of the State Council, Chairs a Meeting of the Central Committee's 
Leading Group on Responding to the Pneumonia Outbreak Caused by the Novel 
Coronavirus (Excerpts), EMBASSY OF THE P.R.C. IN THE U.S. (Feb. 5, 2020), 
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/t1740693.htm [https://perma.cc/BM7L-
NDX7]; John Dotson, The CCP’s New Leading Small Group for Countering the 
Coronavirus Epidemic—and the Mysterious Absence of Xi Jinping, JAMESTOWN 
FOUND. (Feb. 5, 2020, 4:51 PM), https://jamestown.org/program/the-ccps-new-
leading-small-group-for-countering-the-coronavirus-epidemic-and-the-
mysterious-absence-of-xi-jinping/ [https://perma.cc/6LHC-8LUH]. 
140 See Elizabeth J. Perry, From Mass Campaigns to Managed Campaigns: 
“Constructing a New Socialist Countryside,” in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND: THE 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 30, 31–32 
(Elizabeth J. Perry & Sebastian Heilmann eds., 2011) (arguing that post-Mao, 
Chinese leaders did not abandon the campaign mode of governance but rather 
shifted from revolutionary campaigns to managed ones that fit within a 
framework emphasizing technology and rationalization).  See generally GORDON 
BENNETT, YUNDONG: MASS CAMPAIGNS IN CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP 
(1976) (providing a history and overview of campaigns in China). 
141 deLisle, supra note 6, at 598 (quoting People’s Daily). 
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language was less prominent in the early effort against COVID, but 
it was not absent.  In late January, for example, Xi, too, referred to 
the fight against the epidemic as a “people’s war”142 and called the 
coronavirus a “devil” that his administration “will not let hide.”143 
During and after the initial emergency response, Chinese 
authorities were able to rely on a robust apparatus of old-style, labor-
intensive methods, and new-fangled, high-tech means for monitoring 
and constraining the behavior of citizens to prevent the spread and 
reemergence of COVID-19.  The ubiquitous guards at the entrances 
to apartment blocks enforced prohibitions on entry and exit.  Bounties 
were offered for reporting neighbors’ violations of COVID 
containment rules.  Prosecutors’ offices encouraged citizens to 
inform them—including through the “letters and visits” [xinfang] 
system that went remote and online amid the pandemic—of COVID-
risk-creating unlawful behavior. 144   Residents’ committees [shequ 
 
142 Xi, supra note 63; see also Notice, supra note 102 (referring to the response to 
COVID-19 as a war).  
143 Zeng Rong, Embassy Spokesperson’s Letter to the Economist on its Unjustified 
Comments on China’s Fight against the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic, EMBASSY 
OF CHINA IN THE U.K. (Feb. 21, 2020), http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/PressandMedia/t1748533.htm [https://perma.cc/FP3L-
HHAU]; see also He et al, supra note 116, at 251-252 (describing use of “war 
narrative” in mobilization to address COVID-19). 
144 Emily Feng & Amy Cheng, Restrictions And Rewards: How China Is Locking 
Down Half A Billion Citizens, NPR (Feb. 21, 2020, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/02/21/806958341/restrictions-
and-rewards-how-china-is-locking-down-half-a-billion-citizens 
[https://perma.cc/RJ8D-9KTG]; Jeremy Page, China’s Progress Against 
Coronavirus Used Draconian Tactics Not Deployed in the West, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 24, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-west-is-
misinterpreting-wuhans-coronavirus-progressand-drawing-the-wrong-lessons-
11585074966 [https://perma.cc/5GKT-RYPF]; Brenda Goh & Thomas Suen, In 
China, walled up Wuhan awaits life beyond the barricades, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 
2020, 8:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-wuhan-
barricades/in-china-walled-up-wuhan-awaits-life-beyond-the-barricades-
idUSKBN21G0I9 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200331071605if_/https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-health-coronavirus-wuhan-barricades/in-china-walled-up-wuhan-awaits-life-
beyond-the-barricades-idUSKBN21G0I9]; Shouli Qunzhong Xinfang de Qudao 
Shizhong Changtong Jiancha Jiguan Kongshen Bumen Yiqing Fangkong Qijian 
Banli Xinfang Yinghuijinhui (受理群众信访的渠道始终畅通检察机关控申部门
疫情防控期间办理信访应回尽回) [The Mass Petitioning System Shall Remain 
Available and Responsive to the Public to the Extent Possible], CHINA PEACE 
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jumin weiyuanhui]—an extra-governmental body under party-state 
leadership created early in the PRC’s history to establish control at 
very local levels in cities—were tasked with enforcing quarantine and 
isolation orders, securing necessary supplies for people under 
lockdown, and intensively monitoring citizens’ behavior and health 
status.145  COVID containment efforts also relied on a ubiquitous 
“grid” system (established after 2013 to provide more proactive urban 
social management) that, in the case of Wuhan, divided the city into 
10,000 units, with staffing reinforced amid the outbreak by the 
redeployment of more than 40,000 municipal government staff, to 
conduct monitoring, transmit directives and information, and provide 
resources to citizens.146  Many of these measures had foundations in 
various laws and regulations, including those that formally gave 
governmental and other entities expansive authority—and imposed 
extensive duties on medical institutions, enterprises and citizens to 
 
(Feb. 17, 2020), http://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/chinapeace/c54219/2020-
02/17/content_12324490.shtml [https://perma.cc/9E67-P7NY]. 
145 Judith Audin, Governing Through the Neighborhood Community (shequ) in 
China, 65 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 85 (2015); Toby Lincoln, 
The Urban History That Makes China’s Coronavirus Lockdown Possible, 
CONVERSATION (Mar. 3, 2020, 7:44 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-urban-
history-that-makes-chinas-coronavirus-lockdown-possible-132616 
[https://perma.cc/9FKK-575P]; Wang Wenwen, Neighborhood Committees are in 
the Vanguard of Virus Control, GLOB. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2020, 9:43 PM), 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1184356.shtml [https://perma.cc/T9YN-
ALDS]; How Does China Combat Coronavirus: 7,148 Residential Communities 
in Wuhan Are on Lockdown, XINHUA (Mar. 11, 2020, 7:49 PM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-03/11/c_138867074.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T36Q-WZ4K]; Raymond Zhong & Paul Mozur, To Tame 
Coronavirus, Mao-Style Social Control Blankets China, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/15/business/china-coronavirus-
lockdown.html [https://perma.cc/T7CK-7L7Y].  
146 See, e.g., Community Grid System Helps China Fight Virus, infra note 155; 
Willaim Zheng & Kristin Huang, Street by Street, Home by Home: How China 
Used Social Controls to Tame an Epidemic, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 20, 
2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3080912/wuhans-
elderly-reminded-life-under-mao-during-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/94GR-
YX5N]; William Zheng, Grass-Roots Officials Take Lead Role on the Front Line 
of Wuhan’s Grid-by-Grid Battle Against Coronavirus, S. CHINA MORNING POST 
(Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3075453/grass-roots-officials-
take-lead-role-front-line-wuhans-grid-grid [https://perma.cc/TF23-BP57]. 
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cooperate—in responding to infectious disease epidemics and public 
health emergencies.147    
Especially in cities that were not fully locked down and as 
closed-down areas began to reopen, state authorities deployed 
formidable resources for testing, tracing, and containing COVID 
cases.  China’s highly digitized and online urban society (where 
people rely on mobile phone-based apps for a vast range of daily 
activities and transactions), pervasive networks of cameras and 
sensors, extensive use of facial recognition technology, and artificial 
intelligence combined to provide potent means for combatting the 
virus’s spread.148  Big data tools were used to identify probabilities 
of outbreaks and mobility patterns that could lead to spread, and guide 
decisions to impose or lift restrictions.149  More individual-targeting 
 
147 See the many provisions cited in note 131.  For example, there was, at least 
arguably, an affirmative legal basis for assigning such roles to the residents’ 
committees.  See, e.g., Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 9 (providing 
that residents’ committees are responsible for organizing residents to participate 
in control and prevention of infection diseases); Emergency Response Law, supra 
note 29, arts. 55, 57 (providing that residents’ committees are to undertake 
publicity and mobilizational measures to respond to an emergency situation). 
148 To Curb Covid-19, China is Using its High-tech Surveillance Tools, 
ECONOMIST (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.economist.com/china/2020/02/29/to-
curb-covid-19-china-is-using-its-high-tech-surveillance-tools 
[https://perma.cc/Z2F4-XH74]; Yingzhi Yang & Julie Zhu, Coronavirus Brings 
China's Surveillance State out of the Shadows, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2020, 7:20 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-surveillance/coronavirus-brings-
chinas-surveillance-state-out-of-the-shadows-idUSKBN2011HO 
[https://perma.cc/2K3J-VKZA]; Amy Gadsden, The Post-COVID-19 Future of 
Surveillance in China, PENN GLOBAL (May 20, 2020), 
https://global.upenn.edu/perryworldhouse/news/post-covid-19-future-
surveillance-china [https://perma.cc/K784-E5NU]; Nicholas Wright, Coronavirus 
and the Future of Surveillance, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 6, 2020), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-04-06/coronavirus-and-future-
surveillance [https://perma.cc/JSR4-UWCQ]; Shawn Yuan, How China is Using 
AI and Big Data to Fight the Coronavirus, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 1, 2020), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/01/how-china-is-using-ai-and-big-data-
to-fight-the-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/42TT-Z234]. 
149 See Rajib Shaw, Yong-kyun Kim & Jinling Hua, Governance, Technology and 
Citizen Behavior in Pandemic: Lessons from COVID-19 in East Asia, 6 
PROGRESS DISASTER SCI. 1, 8 (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100090 [https://perma.cc/WG5J-QRZL]; see 
also Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(Covid-19), at 15, WHO (DATE) https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-Covid-19-final-report.pdf 
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tools included taking the temperatures of people entering factories, 
office buildings and schools,150 scanning QR codes to check the “red, 
yellow, or green” health status of people seeking to use public 
transportation,151 tracking down travelers who had been on trains and 
planes with infected fellow passengers, and tracing the contacts of 
people who were determined to be infected.152  Chinese media carried 
striking reports of people wanted by the authorities turning 
themselves in because life on the lam had become so difficult amid 
COVID-driven restrictions on mobility for those who could not 
obtain the necessary digital permissions.153 
Legal underpinnings for some of the more intrusive 
monitoring measures are relatively attenuated and problematic.  The 
principal and most accepted bases are the provisions in the Infectious 
Disease Law that direct disease control and prevention organs (with 
an underlying  planning role for local governments and the NHC and 
local HCs) to “monitor/undertake surveillance” [jiance] of infectious 
diseases and outbreaks of infectious diseases. 154   More specific 
operational directives to conduct tracking and tracing of people who 
have COVID-19 and their close contacts, and to use artificial 
intelligence and big data, as well as extensive low-tech/labor-
intensive “grid” surveillance, to contain or prevent spread are 
contained in a variety “normative documents” [guifanxing wenjian] 
or “departmental work documents” [bumen gongzuo wenjian] that do 
 
[https://perma.cc/DST3-EB7U] (crediting use of big data and AI for playing a 
significant role in China’s response).  
150 Coco Feng, Coronavirus: AI Firms Deploy Fever Detection Systems in Beijing 
to Fight Outbreak, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 6, 2020, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3049215/ai-firms-deploy-fever-
detection-systems-beijing-help-fight-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/CA7F-LJHB]. 
151 Paul Mozur et al., In Coronavirus Fight, China Gives Citizens a Color Code, 
With Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-
surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/NG5T-9WHX]. 
152 Yuan, supra note 148; see also STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. PRC, supra note 
14, § II.5. 
153 24 Nian Sharenfan Mei Lüma Zishou; Pandian Yiqingqi Zishou de Taofanmen 
(24 年杀人犯没绿码自首 盘点疫情期自首的逃犯们) [24-Year Murder 
Criminal On-the-Run Surrenders Voluntarily Due to Not Possessing Safety Code, 
A Count of Criminals Turning Themselves in During the Pandemic], SINA NEWS 
(May 5, 2020, 9:29 AM), https://zx.sina.cn/2020-05-05/zx-
iircuyvi1370445.d.html [https://perma.cc/A2US-GHX7]. 
154 See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, art. 7. 17–18, 20. 
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not have the force of law and are issued by the State Council’s Joint 
Control and Prevention Mechanism or the NHC.155  The absence of a 
more clear and robust legal basis has been a source of concern, 
especially because the measures used for tracking, tracing, and 
surveilling can involve or lead to coercive measures and entail 
significant intrusions on personal rights.156 
 
155 See, e.g., Guowuyuan Yingdui Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan 
Yiqing Lianfang Liankong Jizhi (国务院应对新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情联
防联控机制) [The State Council Mechanism for the Joint Control and Prevention 
of Pneumonia Epidemic Caused by the Novel Coronavirus Infection], Feiyan 
Jizhi Fa (2020) 9 Hao (肺炎机制发〔2020〕9 号) [Distributed by the 
Mechanism (2020) No. 9]; Guanyu Yinfa Jinqi Fangkong Xinxing Guangzhuang 
Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Gongzuo Fangan de Tongzhi (关于印发近期防控新型
冠状病毒感染的肺炎工作方案的通知) [Notice on Printing and Distributing the 
Work Plan for the Prevention and Control of Pneumonia Caused by the Novel 
Coronavirus Infection in the Near Future], (Jan. 27, 2020), §§ 1, 2(2) (concerning 
use of big data, grid surveillance, and artificial intelligence in responding to the 
noval coronavirus); Nat’l Health Comm’n PRC, Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu 
Ganran de Feiyan Fangkong Fangan (Dierban) (新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎防控
方案(第二版)) [Pneumonia Prevention and Control Plan for Novel Coronavirus 
Infection (2nd Ed.)] (Jan. 22, 2020), §§ 3(2)(1), 3(6) (concerning contact tracing); 
Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing Lianfang Liankong Jizhi (国务院
应对新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情联防联控机制) [The State Council 
Mechanism for the Joint Control and Prevention of Pneumonia Epidemic Caused 
by the Novel Coronavirus Infection], Feiyan Jizhi Fa (2020) 5 Hao (肺炎机制发
〔2020〕5 号) [Distributed by the Mechanism (2020) No. 5], Guanyu Jiaqiang 
Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing Shequ Fangkong 
Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于加强新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情社区防控工作
的通知) [Mechanism for the Joint Control and Prevention of Pneumonia 
Epidemics in Response to Novel Coronavirus Infection, Notice on Strengthening 
Community Control and Prevention of Pneumonia Epidemics of Novel 
Coronavirus Infection] (Jan. 24, 2020), §§ 2(1)(3), 2(2)(2–3), 3(3) (concerning 
tracking of infected individuals and tracing close contacts).  See also Community 
Grid System Helps China Fight Virus, GLOB. TIMES (Feb 5. 2020), 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178528.shtml [https://perma.cc/4AQ7-
B5BB]. 
156 See Shen Kui (沈岿), Dayi Zhixia Shandai Meiyige Ren de Jiben Quanli (大疫
之下善待每一个人的基本权利) [Protecting Everybody’s Basic Rights Under a 
Great Epidemic], CONST. & ADMIN. L. RSCH. CTR. PEKING UNIV. (Feb. 17, 2020), 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/FSqrvCo9SkEEfG1apkeE6A [https://perma.cc/FEL8-
NCRX]; Tong Zhiwei (童之伟), Zai Fazhi Guidao Shang Huajie Gonggong 
Weisheng Weiji (在法治轨道上化解公共卫生危机) [Resolve the Public Health 
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Finally, in combatting the pandemic, Chinese authorities also 
benefited from the absence or weakness of features that have been 
barriers to some types of state responses in some other countries.  As 
a matter of constitutional principle, China is a unitary state in which 
powers legitimately exercised by lower-level governments are 
delegated at the discretion of the central government and can be 
reclaimed or overridden, unlike in a federal constitutional system.157  
In practice, extensive powers of governance and policymaking have 
devolved to provincial and sub-provincial units, partly as a conscious 
strategy during much of the Reform Era.  Although the initial reaction 
to COVID-19 in Wuhan showed the difficulties that can arise from 
local autonomy, central authorities have retained de facto as well as 
de jure capacity to reassert control, especially in times of crisis or in 
pursuit of high-priority goals, and there has been an overall trend 
toward recentralization since Xi Jinping came to power.158  These 
features were reflected in the response to COVID-19.  Once the 
central leadership moved to implement lockdowns, travel bans, and 
pervasive surveillance, its actions were not constrained—nor was its 
ultimate responsibility muddled—by notions about subnational 
authority or ambiguous allocations of powers and duties between 
center and localities.159  
Efforts to monitor, trace, and contain COVID-19 cases also 
did not face significant limitations from laws or norms protecting 
privacy interests.  The proper balance between public interests (in the 
COVID-19 context, public health interests) and privacy rights (in the 
COVID-19 context, data privacy and surveillance-related issues) has 
 
Crisis on Tracks of the Rule of Law], AISIXIANG (爱思想) (Mar. 2, 2020) 
http://www.aisixiang.com/data/120415.html [https://perma.cc/4EWJ-F48F]. 
157 See XIANFA §§ 2–3, 58, 63, 67, 89 (2018); Zhu Suli, Federalism in 
Contemporary China–A Reflection on the Allocation of Power between the 
Central and Local Government, 7 SINGAPORE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2003).  
158 See ZHENG YONGNIAN, DE FACTO FEDERALISM IN CHINA (2008); Shirk, supra 
note 92; Mertha, supra note 28; and supra the discussion accompanying note 112.  
159 Connor Boyd, Chinese People are Happiest with their Government’s Handling 
of the Covid-19 Pandemic–While the US has Only Fared Slightly Better than 
Britain, Poll Claims, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 5, 2020), 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8806987/China-responded-best-Covid-
19-pandemic-study-claims.html [https://perma.cc/9BGE-UQKX]; Emily Jacobs, 
Biden Walks Back National Mask Mandate Over ‘Constitutional Issue,’ N.Y. 
POST (Sept. 8, 2020), https://nypost.com/2020/09/08/joe-biden-walks-back-
national-mask-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/F9VT-7YB3]. 
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become a focus in legal and policy-relevant discussions in China.160  
Especially among urban, educated, and younger-generation Chinese, 
“privacy” has become a significant concern in recent times.161  To the 
reported frustration of some public health experts trying to implement 
tracking and tracing to manage COVID-19, some Chinese internet 
companies resisted providing user information, citing data privacy 
concerns.162  But, overall, the regime faced only weak constraints on 
these fronts.  Legal protections for data privacy, privacy rights more 
broadly, and civil liberties still more broadly (including rights not to 
be detained in the interest of protecting public health) did not 
significantly limit state-mandated measures to fight COVID-19.  
Despite significant changes in China in recent years, cultural norms 
favoring individual privacy are generally seen as less potent and 
central in China than in Western societies,163 and thus are not likely 
to produce effective pressure on the Chinese government and 
 
160 See Shen Kui , The Stumbling Balance between Public Health and Privacy 
amid the Pandemic in China, CHINESE J. COMPAR. L. (forthcoming 2021) 
(discussing the factors that have caused China to “stumble” in finding a proper 
balance between public health surveillance and privacy protection). 
161 See, e.g., William Yang, How Much Chinese People Care About Privacy?, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/how-much-do-
chinese-people-care-about-privacy/a-43358120 [https://perma.cc/B2G5-XMVA] 
(reporting that generally, Chinese people are concerned with breaches of privacy); 
Marc Oliver Rieger et al.; What Do Young Chinese Think about Social Credit? 
It’s Complicated, MERCATOR INST. FOR CHINESE STUD. (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://merics.org/en/report/what-do-young-chinese-think-about-social-credit-its-
complicated [https://perma.cc/372C-5VVC] (arguing based on a survey of urban, 
young, and educated Chinese respondents that privacy and government 
surveillance are major concerns).   
162 Peter Hessler, How China Controlled the Coronavirus, NEW YORKER (Aug. 
10, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/08/17/how-china-
controlled-the-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/RV2Q-ZHV2]. 
163 See, e.g., Bonnie S. McDougall, Privacy in Modern China,  2 HIST. COMPASS 
1, 5–6 (2004) (discussing increase of, but continuing limitations to, concepts of 
privacy in society and in official policy and law); Tiffany Li et Zhou Zhoun & Jill 
Bronfman,  Saving Face:  Unfolding the Screen of Chinese Privacy Law, J. L., 
INFO., & SCI., (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3–5) (describing limited concept of 
privacy in Chinese culture and implications for Chinese privacy law) 
(https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2826087); Kenneth Neil Farrall, Global Privacy 
in Flux: Illuminating Privacy Across Cultures in China and the U.S. 2 INT’L J. 
COMM. 993, 1005–15 (2008) (describing rising, from low base, popular interest in 
and demand for privacy, and legal protections for privacy rights in China); see 
also Yang, supra note 161; Rieger et al., supra note 161.  
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effective obstacles to its authoritarian methods for coping with a 
major crisis. 
Although there are reports of popular discontent with some of 
the methods the authorities adopted to address the COVID-19 
epidemic in China,164 there was no prospect that centrally mandated, 
high-priority measures would be compromised by lawsuits 
challenging mask requirements or quarantine orders, mass refusals to 
install tracking apps or cooperate with contact-tracers, or large-scale 
defiance among the public or sub-national officials of state-ordered, 
science-based public health directives.  The narrow scope and fragile 
tolerance for social resistance to legal and policy directives, and the 
effective tools that authorities can wield to stifle open opposition, 
constrain the possibilities for public action to affect the regime’s 
choices.  Moreover, many of the measures adopted by the authorities 
to counter the pandemic appear to have been accepted as legitimate 
by much of the general public.165  Social behavior in much of the 
Chinese Mainland paralleled what was found throughout much of 
East Asia, from South Korea to Taiwan to Hong Kong to Vietnam, 
where there were high levels of public compliance with government 
rules and policies to detect, monitor, and contain COVID-19, and 
acceptance of restrictions on, or suspension of, ordinary economic 
and social activities and liberties.166 
 
164 See, e.g., Anna Fifield, As Coronavirus Goes Global, China’s Xi Asserts 
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China’s Coronavirus Response Could Build Public Support for its Government, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2020), 
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REFORMS AHEAD? ADDRESSING WEAKNESSES AND 
PREPARING FOR THE NEXT TIME 
Several reforms might improve responses to novel 
coronavirus-like problems in China.  Some signs point to substantial 
prospects for reform in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis.  Laws 
relevant to addressing potential epidemics and public health 
emergencies underwent significant revisions after the most closely 
analogous prior crisis—the less disruptive and damaging SARS 
epidemic in 2003.  In June 2020, the government’s White Paper on 
the response to COVID-19 noted that the battle against the pandemic 
had exposed various “deficiencies in the national response system” 
that China would address through measures that were likely to 
include legal changes. 167   Two weeks after the lockdown was 
imposed in Wuhan, Xi Jinping called for legal reforms, implicitly to 
address shortcomings revealed in the COVID-19 response, including 
moves to “strengthen construction of the rule of law,” to “revise and 
improve” the Infectious Disease Law and the Wild Animal 
Conservation Law [Yesheng Dongwu Baohu Fa], and to enact a new 
Biosafety Law (which was promulgated in October 2020 and in 
relevant part largely tracks the Infectious Disease Law’s general 
provisions on reporting, prevention, and control of infectious 
diseases).168  A few months later, Xi called for improvement of the 
systems for detecting diseases of unknown origin and assuring 
accurate and timely monitoring and reporting of epidemics—an 
agenda item that echoed the rationale of the post-SARS creation of 
the Direct Reporting System and acknowledged the need for further 
 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0275074020943707 
[https://perma.cc/7ELT-DWGS]; Andrew Sheng & Xiao Geng, How the East 
Asian Mind-Set Succeeded with the Coronavirus When Western Individualism 
Failed, MKT. WATCH (Aug. 30, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-
the-east-asian-mind-set-succeeded-with-the-coronavirus-when-western-
individualism-failed-11598561912 [https://perma.cc/TK32-TGT4]; When Culture 
Clashes with Covid-19, MIT NEWS (June 25, 2020), 
https://news.mit.edu/2020/when-culture-clashes-covid-19-0625 
[https://perma.cc/T78X-SR98].  
167 STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. P.R.C., supra note 14, § II.  
168 Xi, supra note 63.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shengwu Anquanfa (中华
人民共和国生物安全法) [Biosecurity Law of the People's Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 17, 2020, 
effective Apr. 15, 2021), arts. 27–33 [hereinafter Biosecurity Law]. 
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changes in the same vein.169  Still, legal reforms that might achieve 
significant change face several considerable, and diverse, 
impediments.   
First, as such official statements suggest, post-COVID 
reforms to laws and rules on preparing for, detecting, and responding 
to serious disease outbreaks and other emergencies might address 
some of the issues discussed in this article and other assessments of 
China’s handling of the novel coronavirus pandemic.  Legal reforms 
could reduce ambiguities in the content—and the allocation—of the 
powers and responsibilities of officials in local governments and in 
the central government’s public health and disease control apparatus, 
including those related to detecting and disclosing to higher levels or 
to the public an outbreak of a potentially serious infectious disease 
and the occurrence of a public health emergency.  More precise and, 
often, narrower mandates for specific officials could ameliorate the 
“Spider-Man principle,” and the confusing or perverse incentives that 
can affect officials’ responses to early signs of a possible 
pandemic.170   Building on provisions in existing laws, 171  reforms 
 
169 Xi Jinping Calls for Improving Epidemic Monitoring, Early Warning 
Capabilities, CGTN (May 25, 2020), https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-24/Xi-
Jinping-joins-panel-discussion-with-NPC-deputies-from-Hubei-
QKQwiYvCO4/index.html [https://perma.cc/F2JL-ELFT]. 
170 See the discussion of the “Spider-Man principle” at supra note 57. 
171 See, e.g., Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, art. 24 (stating that all 
individuals and entities have right to report on potential public health emergency 
to relevant government organ and to report nonfeasance or malfeasance of 
relevant government organs to higher level government organs; and granting 
awards and prizes for individuals and entities for their meritorious work in 
reporting emergencies); Measures for Information Reporting, supra note 36, art. 
37 (requiring an individual or entity to report to relevant-level health commission 
failure by a reporting entity—such as a medical institution—to make an accurate 
report of epidemic or public health emergency).  
See also Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 12, 21, 30–31, 37 
(establishing the general duty of units and individuals to provide truthful 
information on infectious disease incidents; the duty of medical institutions 
[jigou] to task staff with reporting on epidemics; and the duty of medical 
institutions and staff obligations to report on infectious diseases and on 
epidemics); Emergency Response Law, supra note 29, arts. 39, 69 (specifying 
citizens’, legal persons’, and organizations’ duty to report emergency situations to 
relevant government agency; and sanctions for individuals or entities 
disseminating false information about emergency situation or response); 
Regulations on Responses, supra note 31, arts. 21, 51 (proscribing individual or 
entity delaying or concealing or making false report on public health emergency, 
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could give clinicians and hospitals clearer legal rights and duties to 
effectuate compliance with the goals of the Direct Reporting System, 
including by bypassing their bosses and local governments to give the 
CDC, NHC, and other central authorities timely access to vital 
information.  Rules demanding more extensive and more rapid 
disclosures of disease outbreaks and public health emergencies to the 
public could increase outside-the-party-state pressure on, and thus 
accountability of, local officials. Such reforms could offset somewhat 
the incentives that local officials face to focus on upward 
accountability to higher-level officials and to succumb to the 
temptation to take the “cover up” side of the double-or-nothing bet.172  
If such laws were adopted, challenges would still remain.  As 
troubled aspects of China’s response to COVID-19 remind us, while 
poorly designed laws are likely to lead to failures, even well-designed 
laws do not assure success.  Difficulties arising from structural 
features of the Chinese administrative state, local government, and 
the roles of the party can be mitigated only to a limited extent even 
by clear and well-crafted laws.  As discussed earlier in this article, 
there are sound reasons, and enduring appeal, for both tiao and kuai 
solutions to problems of Chinese governance.  Notably, 
commentators in China made arguments on both sides of the tiao vs. 
kuai dilemma when assessing weaknesses in the Emergency 
Response Law and the Infectious Disease Law in the immediate 
aftermath of the flawed initial response to COVID-19.173   
Effective reform of complex legal frameworks is all the more 
difficult when drafters have complex, multifaceted agendas, as they 
would here.  Managing public health threats remains only one 
 
and specifying sanctions for violations of reporting requirements); Measures for 
Information Reporting, supra note 36, arts. 10, 16, 19, 40–41 (setting forth the 
responsibilities of medical institutions and staff to report, not to conceal, and not 
to make false reports on epidemics or public health emergencies). 
172 See Shen, supra note 81, at 34–35 (stating that a reform allowing free 
disclosure to the public and free discussion of information about risks would 
create sufficient pressure on governments to respond to risks in a timely fashion). 
173 See Wang Jun (王俊), 17 Nianhou Yiqing Zaixi, Guanfang Toulu 
“Chuanranbing Fangzhifa” Jiang Zaixiu (17 年后疫情再袭，官方透露《传染
病防治法》将再修), XINJING BAO (新京报) [BEIJING NEWS] (Mar. 25, 2020, 
9:48:21 PM), http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2020/03/25/708946.html 
[https://perma.cc/6MBR-EUKF] (discussing commentators’ arguments for the 
strengths and weaknesses of both the tiao and kuai side solutions).  
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concern among many for those who design and implement China’s 
laws.  As noted earlier, it is rarely the top worry.  Wuhan officials’ 
delay in publicly disclosing the threat from the novel coronavirus 
apparently partly reflected concerns about triggering public panic and 
social disorder.  An emphasis on other, traditionally preeminent 
concerns—such as restoring economic activity—very quickly 
resurfaced as national-level policy priorities a few weeks into the 
epidemic once the prevention and control measures appeared to be 
effective.  Dilemmas arising from conflicting and dissimilar policy 
priorities chronically bedevil political decisionmakers, law-drafters, 
and regulators everywhere, and China—where their decisions 
reshape the rules of a very-high-stakes game of “double or nothing” 
bets for officials bearing multiple duties—is certainly no exception. 
Another significant obstacle is captured by a common saying 
about law in China: zhixing nan—“implementation is hard.”  
Difficulty in implementation is a ubiquitous issue, but it is especially 
challenging in systems with several features found in China, 
including relatively high levels of bureaucratic fragmentation and 
vast scale (and therefore more layers of government and more 
numerous and far-flung targets of regulation).  As many assessments 
have noted, the seemingly promising and evidently sincere efforts to 
build, partly through legal reforms, a more effective system for 
addressing SARS-like challenges floundered in implementation in 
the context of the strikingly similar challenges posed by COVID-19. 
Second, China could adopt more ambitious laws to address 
the origins or sources of potential pandemics.  The discussion at the 
beginning of this article joins China’s COVID-19 story in its second 
chapter, after a tale of earlier failure, including of laws and policies 
to regulate and limit the risks of deadly and contagious viruses 
crossing into the human population.  Public health authorities in 
China—and elsewhere—were already well aware that devastating 
communicable diseases could cross from wild animals to people, and 
that markets selling wild animals for human consumption offered a 
dangerously effective pathway (as was recognized to some degree in 
pertinent laws).174  SARS and other infectious diseases emanating 
 
174 See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 25, 42, 75 (concerning control 
of infectious diseases transmissible between humans and animals, including 
regulation of trade in wild animals). 
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from China in recent years had leapt from animals to people through 
such vectors, and then spread rapidly and widely.175   
Yet, when COVID-19 emerged, the post-SARS versions of a 
principal relevant law—the Wild Animal Conservation Law—still 
permitted hunting, trapping, breeding, marketing, sale, and 
consumption of animals that were not on the very limited list of 
species that authorities had declared rare or endangered and under 
“priority conservation” [zhongdian baohu].176  Provided that proper 
licenses and certificates are obtained, the law permits trafficking, 
including as food for human consumption, of non-domesticated 
species that are potential hosts for diseases that could pass to 
humans.177  The law also echoes the tiao vs. kuai ambiguities and 
tensions of “dual rule” in allocating roles and responsibilities among 
units in the central specialized bureaucracy and lower-level 
governments that beset emergency response and infectious disease 
laws and contributed to the problematic early response to the COVID-
19 outbreak.178 
On January 26, 2020, three days after the lockdown of Wuhan, 
the State Administration for Market Regulation, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs, and the National Forestry and 
Grassland Administration—consistent with provisions in the 
Infectious Disease Law—issued a joint Notice on Prohibiting Trade 
in Wild Animals.  The Notice banned the transportation, trading, and 
sale of wild animals for human consumption for the duration of the 
epidemic, called on local governments and relevant departments to 
strengthen inspections, shut down violators and refer serious violators 
for criminal prosecution, and encouraged citizens to report illegal 
 
175 Robert G. Webster, Wet Markets—A Continuing Source of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome and Influenza?, 363 LANCET 234. 234–235 (Jan. 17, 2004), 
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(03)15329-
9/fulltext [https://perma.cc/8FDC-SKZW]. 
176 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yesheng Dongwu Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国
野生动物保护法) [Wild Animal Conservation Law of the People's Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 8, 1988, 
rev’d Oct. 26, 2018. effective Oct. 26, 2018), arts. 2, 10, 21, 30–33, 44–51 
CLI.1.324957(EN) (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Wild Animal Conservation Law]. 
177 Id. arts. 21–23, 27, 30–33. 
178 Id. arts. 7–8, 10–19, 25–28, 34–35. 
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trade in wild animals.179  Nearly a month later, on February 24, 2020, 
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee—which has 
wide-ranging law-making powers—issued a “Decision on 
Completely Prohibiting Illegal Trade in Wild Animals, Eliminating 
the Bad Habit of Indiscriminately Eating Wild Animals, and 
Earnestly Ensuring the Life, Health, and Safety of the People.”180  
The Decision banned hunting, trading, transportation, and use—for 
human consumption—of wild species of land animals.  It also called 
for heavy penalties for violating existing law and directed 
governments at all levels to increase supervision, investigation, and 
punishment of the prohibited activities.  Some local governments 
issued even stricter rules.181   
 
179 SHICHANG JIANGUAN ZONGJU (市场监管总局) [STATE ADMIN. FOR MKT. 
REGUL.] et al., Guanyu Jinzhi Yesheng Dongwu Jiaoyi de Gonggao (关于禁止野
生动物交易的公告) [Announcement on the Prohibition of Trading in Wild 
Aninals] (Jan. 26, 2020) http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-
01/26/content_5472280.htm [https://perma.cc/2FB7-EME6]; see also Zhang Fan 
(张帆), Zhongguo Neidi 31 Shengfen Quanbu Qidong Tufa Gonggong Weisheng 
Shijian Yiji Xiangying (中国内地 31 省份全部启动突发公共卫生事件一级响
应), CAIXIN (财新) (Jan. 29, 2020, 10:47 PM), http://china.caixin.com/2020-01-
29/101509411.html [https://perma.cc/7NB2-EGA9] (concerning national and 
provincial measures in response to the novel coronavirus); Infectious Disease 
Law, supra note 32, art 25 (authorizing government departments in charge of 
agriculture and forestry and other relevant departments to address prevention, 
treatment, and control of infectious diseases common to humans and animals). 
180 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Quanmian 
Jinzhi Feifa Yeshengdongwu Jiaoyi, Gechu Lanshi Yeshengdongwu Louxi, 
Qieshi Baozhang Renmin Qunzhong Shengming Jiankang Anquan de Jueding (全
国人民代表大会常务委员会关于全面禁止非法野生动物交易、革除滥食野
生动物陋习、切实保障人民群众生命健康安全的决定) [Decision on 
Completely Prohibiting Illegal Trade in Wildlife, Eliminating the Bad Habit of 
Indiscriminately Eating Wild Animals, and Earnestly Ensuring the Life, Health, 
and Safety of the People] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Feb. 24, 2020, effective Feb. 24, 2020), CLI.1.339750(EN) 
(Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Decision on Trade in Wildlife]; China’s Legislature 
Adopts Decision on Banning Illegal Trade, Consumption of Wildlife, XINHUA 
(Feb. 24, 2020 8:34:59 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-
02/24/c_138814328.htm [https://perma.cc/L4L6-4PRN].  
181 See, e.g., Bai Yanbing (白岩冰), Hubei Quanmian Jinzhi Shiyong 
Yeshengdongwu! (湖北全面禁止食用野生动物) [Hubei Banned Consumption of 
Wild Animals Completely], GUOJI JINRONG BAO (国际金融报) [INT’L FIN. NEWS] 
(Mar. 7, 2020, 10:15 PM), http://www.ifnews.com/news.html?aid=71030 
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The NPC also reportedly decided to fast-track amendments to 
several public health and safety laws, including revising the Wild 
Animal Conservation Law to make permanent the restrictions on 
trade and consumption of wildlife adopted amid the COVID-19 
outbreak.  But no new amendments were adopted—and further study 
was ordered—at the NPC’s 2020 session.182  Initial indications were 
that the law would continue to permit marketing and consumption of 
many species as part of traditional Chinese medicine—an exception, 
critics argued, that would permit public-health-endangering practices 
to continue relatively unabated.183 
Here, the issue of zhixing nan—implementation is hard—
looms especially large.  In addition to the challenges endemic to 
 
[https://perma.cc/42V6-EP4D] (reporting that Hubei banned consumption of wild 
animals completely). 
182 See Li Yunshu (李云舒), Quanguo Renda Chutai Jueding Beihou: Yong Fazhi 
Gechu Chiyewei Louxi (全国人大出台决定背后:用法治革除吃野味陋习), 
CCDI (Feb. 25, 2020, 6:25 AM), 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowen/202002/t20200225_212177.html 
[https://perma.cc/8FGH-CWGT] (discussing the rationale behind NPC’s decision 
to restrict trade and consumption of wildlife); Liu Weibing, China to prioritize 
Legislation on Public Health in 2020, XINHUA (May 26, 2020, 8:28 AM), 
http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/0526/c90000-9694301.html [https://perma.cc/PBN9-
5VAL] (“[NPC] said it plans to revise the Wildlife Protection Law, the Law on 
the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases, the Frontier Health and 
Quarantine Law, and the Emergency Response Law in 2020.”); Steven Lee 
Myers, China Vowed to Keep Wildlife Off the Menu, a Tough Promise to Keep,  
N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/world/asia/china-coronavirus-wildlife-
ban.html [https://perma.cc/CFY5-PVPP] (“China’s legislature, the National 
People’s Congress, adjourned its annual session late last month without adopting 
new laws that would end the trade.”).  
183 James Gorman, China’s Ban on Wildlife Trade a Big Step, but Has Loopholes, 
Conservationists Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/science/coronavirus-pangolin-wildlife-ban-
china.html [https://perma.cc/5NPX-9K9S]; Aron White, China’s Wildlife Trade 
Policy—Where Are We Now And What Might Come Next?, ENVTL. 
INVESTIGATION AGENCY (May 7, 2020), https://eia-international.org/blog/chinas-
wildlife-trade-policy-where-are-we-now-and-what-might-come-next/ 
[https://perma.cc/F7ZN-2EJC].  The exception for medical and other non-eating 
uses is embodied in the NPC-SC Decision as well.  See Decision on Trade in 
Wildlife, supra note 180.  
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putting regulatory laws into practice in China,184 rules that might 
address the likely sources of COVID-19 and similar epidemics are 
particularly difficult to execute because they must tackle such widely 
dispersed behavior by so many actors, and restrict activities on which 
targeted actors immediately rely for their livelihoods.  Pre-COVID-
19 efforts to regulate broadly analogous phenomena illustrate the 
challenges.  One example is a mandate to reduce pollution from 
small-scale factories, the implementation of which would threaten 
significant numbers of jobs in surrounding communities.  
Enforcement efforts ultimately turned to what one scholarly account 
calls “blunt force” implementation—local officials meeting quotas 
through shutting down some factories, while leaving others to operate, 
on grounds that bore limited relation to the law’s articulated standards 
and showed little concern for advancing the law’s policy goals 
efficiently or with attention to procedural propriety. 185   Another 
example is rules that sought to end dairy farmers’ malnutrition-
causing dilution of milk used for baby formula.  In response to those 
measures, some of China’s many thousands of small producers added 
toxic melamine to their product to fool government-mandated tests 
for protein content, which led to tens of thousands of injuries and 
several deaths of poisoned infants.186   
Similar problems confront regulatory efforts to restrict or 
close the wild animal markets that have been the initial pathway for 
 
184 The challenges of sheer scale and multiple levels of government that faced 
infectious disease and emergency response laws and regulations extend to this 
context as well.  As noted earlier, although less pronounced, the coexistence of 
tiao and kuai, overlapping or ambiguously allocated authority among specialized 
functional bureaucracies and local governments, and the need for cooperation 
across units of governance are also present to some degree in the law addressing 
trade in wild animals, including for human consumption.  See generally Wild 
Animal Conservation Law, supra note 176, arts. 7–8 10–19. 25–28, 34–35.  
185 Denise Sienli van der Kamp, Blunt Force Regulation and Bureaucratic 
Control: Understanding China’s War on Pollution, GOVERNANCE (forthcoming). 
186 Jim Yardley & David Barboza, Despite Warnings, China’s Regulators Failed 
to Stop Tainted Milk, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 26, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/world/asia/27milk.html 
[https://perma.cc/2PPX-DJJ7];  
Austin Ramzy & Lin Yang, Tainted-Baby-Milk Scandal in China, TIME (Sep. 16, 
2008), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1841535,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/HZ59-R5FM]; Céline Marie-Elise Gossner et al., The Melamine 
Incident: Implications for International Food and Feed Safety, 117 ENV’T 
HEALTH PERSP. 1803 (2009). 
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SARS, COVID-19, and other diseases.  Measures targeting such 
markets also would face additional hurdles because they would seek 
to prohibit something popular with many consumers. 187   In such 
contexts, effective administrative enforcement and sanctions can be 
impossibly costly, as well as unpopular in affected sectors.  More 
limited measures to reduce the problematic behavior would require 
fewer resources, and risk less resistance, but they are likely to be too 
weak to effect the necessary changes in behavior.  Publicity and 
education campaigns are much touted and often tried, but are likely 
to fall short of achieving widespread compliance. 
Third, reforms could allow mechanisms outside the 
administrative state to play greater roles in ameliorating some types 
of problems seen in the COVID-19 epidemic.  Legal reforms, 
including expanded legal rights for non-state actors to expose 
emerging problems, or tightened restrictions on state authorities’ 
discretion to censor and sanction them, could reduce impediments to 
early warnings by doctors and others at the front lines of handling 
disease outbreaks, and reporting by old and new media.  These could 
provide effective supplements to, or substitutes for, state channels 
and thereby mitigate problems of error, shirking, and concealment by 
officials.  
A key moment in accelerating the belated response to SARS 
had come when surgeon Jiang Yanyong made public, through outside 
media, a level of infection far exceeding official accounts.188  When 
 
187 Why ‘Wet Markets’ Persisted in China Despite Disease and Hygiene 
Concerns, NPR (Jan. 22, 2020 4:28 PM), 
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supra note 182; see also Yang Qifei (杨弃非), SARS Guoqu 17 Nian le, 
Weishenme Women Haishi Jiebudiao Yewei? (SARS 过去 17 年了，为什么我们
还是戒不掉野味？), MEIRI JINGJI XINWEN (每日经济新闻) [NAT’L BUS. DAILY] 
(Mar. 7, 2020, 1:56 PM), http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2020-03-
07/1414597.html [https://perma.cc/396E-5SYE] (analyzing why restricting wild 
animal markets is so difficult, including reasons such as customer tastes, status 
symbol effect, and local and wider economic interests). 
188 Mary Ann Benitez, Beijing Doctor Alleges SARS Cases Cover-up in China, 
361 LANCET 1357, 1357 (Apr. 19, 2003), 
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[https://perma.cc/DHE6-GNWG]; Don Weinland, Tale of Two Doctors Reveals 
How China Controls the Narrative, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2020), 
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the novel coronavirus first emerged in 2019, opportunities for a fast 
and effective response were lost when local authorities in Wuhan 
silenced medical staff—most notoriously when police warned Dr. Li 
and others that communicating information about the disturbing new 
pneumonia via social media was unlawful, when hospital officials 
warned Dr. Ai—a key source for Li—to keep silent, and when 
censors blocked COVID-related posts by Li and others.189  On the 
other hand, in the early days of the novel coronavirus outbreak, 
China’s constrained cyberspace informed policy responses in ways 
that could not have occurred sixteen years earlier—possibly having 
alerted central authorities to the emerging problem in Wuhan (by 
leaking the WHC’s previously undisclosed documents) and pushing 
local authorities to adopt more effective or less abusive methods to 
combat the virus (through a torrent of critical posts by netizens 
targeting mayors, municipal party secretaries, and other officials and 
institutions).190 
Reform advocates long have urged more robust legal 
protections for whistleblowers and, a more diffuse public “right to 
know,” particularly during public emergencies. 191   Such reforms 
would be consistent with, and could be justified as serving, the 
principle—long accepted by the party and state—of “people’s 
supervision” over political and governmental authority.  There are 
some foundations for a modest public right to know—or at least the 
correlative obligation to inform—in the provisions in emergency 
response and infectious disease laws and regulations concerning 
public warnings and announcements of measures to address 
imminent or occurring epidemics. 192  Reforms in this vein thus could 
 
https://www.ft.com/content/cf59b132-43d7-11ea-a43a-c4b328d9061c 
[https://perma.cc/GM34-PTR5]. 
189 See supra text accompanying note 40.  
190 See, e.g., Raymond Zhong, As Virus Spreads, Anger Floods Chinese Social 
Media, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/technology/china-coronavirus-censorship-
social-media.html [https://perma.cc/VBC9-SRWT]. 
191 See Xiaoling Zhang, Breaking News, Media Coverage and “Citizen’s Right to 
Know” in China, 16 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 535, 535 (2007) (“[A]lthough the 
Chinese media do not lack the capacity to honor the ‘citizen’s right to know’, the 
coverage of breaking news is determined by the state’s perception of a given 
situation.”); deLisle, supra note 8, at 386–87.   
192 See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 32, arts. 65, 68(5) (imposing legal 
responsibility/sanctions on government entities that conceal facts on epidemic 
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build on provisions in existing law and policy.  In assessing the early 
phases of the handling of COVID-19, Chinese authorities implicitly 
acknowledged that suppressing warnings from society was improper 
and counterproductive:  Li—who in the interim had died from 
COVID-19—received praise in official media as a hero, posthumous 
awards and recognition from party-linked organizations, a revocation 
of the Wuhan Public Security Bureau’s admonition, and further 
vindication in the form of statements from a CDC official and the 
Supreme People’s Court’s social media account that criticized the 
behavior of the Wuhan police in stifling Li and others.193   
China’s internet and social media are a promising space for 
achieving vital transparency, as the early days of COVID-19 
illustrated.  For a brief time, Wuhan doctors and their friends 
 
situation or unlawfully fail to perform responsibilities under the law—a category 
that includes notifying the public when the laws so require).  See also supra the 
provisions that address reporting obligations of medical institutions and staff in 
note 158. 
193 See China Exonerates Doctor Reprimanded for Warning of Virus, AP NEWS 
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://apnews.com/6f2e666485e9abae4bb112251eca77be 
[https://perma.cc/5UCX-ZSQR] (discussing how China exonerated and 
apologized to Li Wenliang after his death); Fact and Fiction About U.S. Lies 
Concerning China and the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic, supra note 45 
(describing posthumous praise and awards and Wuhan Public Security Bureau 
withdrawal of admonitions); Jun Mai, Politics May Have Stalled Information in 
Wuhan Coronavirus Crisis, Scientist Says, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 30, 
2020, 8:45 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3048283/politics-may-have-
stalled-information-wuhan-coronavirus-crisis.[https://perma.cc/CFB6-9S9D] 
(quoting Global Times quotation of CDC’s Zeng Guang’s implicit criticism of the 
government’s hesitation to inform the public about COVID-19 by stating that the 
government needed to consider other “factors” and that scientists were only “part 
of their considerations”); Jun Mai, Coronavirus ‘Rumour’ Crackdown by Wuhan 
Police Slammed by China’s Top Court, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 29, 2020, 
3:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3048042/chinas-top-
court-hits-out-wuhan-police-over-coronavirus-rumour [https://perma.cc/9HC6-
RQSX] (reporting on how the Supreme People’s Court lashed out at police for 
punishing citizens who were accused of “spreading rumours” about COVID-19); 
Zhili Youguan Xinxing Feiyan de Yaoyan Wenti, Zhepian Wenzhang Shuo 
Qingchu le! (治理有关新型肺炎的谣言问题，这篇文章说清楚了!) [On the 
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Speaks Clearly!], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. (Jan. 28, 2020),  
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ETgXN6HInzlC8cxzhDdU9g 
[https://perma.cc/HT4V-YD7P].  
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managed to post reports about the eruption of the virus.  Disgruntled 
netizens were able to circulate deleted media articles on COVID-
related issues.  Wuhan resident and eminent Chinese author Fang 
Fang wrote quickly censored but widely read “diary” posts for her 
nearly four million Weibo followers detailing the experiences of 
residents and governmental missteps in Wuhan under lockdown—
except for a period in February 2020 when her account was 
suspended.194  Conventional media offer another potential avenue, as 
the initial weeks of the novel coronavirus showed.  Exposés and 
journalistic first-draft post-mortems of flawed initial responses to 
COVID-19 appeared in Caixin magazine, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao 
[China Youth Daily], and other media venues.  Amid the pandemic, 
some prominent scholars in law and other fields identified a lack of 
protections for freedom of the press and freedom of expression as a 
cause of the government’s failure to deal with the emerging pandemic 
earlier and more effectively.195 
Prospects for major changes on these fronts remain modest.  
As the experiences of Dr. Li, Fang Fang, and other would-be 
informers of the public underscore, social media content and other 
citizen statements unwelcomed by authorities can be taken down, 
content-providers sanctioned, and prospective voices deterred—in 
 
194 See FANG FANG, supra note 27.  See also Hemant Adlakha, Fang Fang: The 
‘Conscience of Wuhan’ Amid Coronavirus Quarantine, DIPLOMAT (Mar. 23, 
2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/fang-fang-the-conscience-of-wuhan-
amid-coronavirus-quarantine/ [https://perma.cc/4UNA-K758]; Yuwen Wu, 
Chinese Propagandists Don’t Want You to Read This Diary on the Coronavirus 
Lockdown in Wuhan, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 2, 2020), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/coronavirus-wuhan-lockdown-fangfang-
diary-china-dr-li-a9368961.html [https://perma.cc/K8EE-BTTQ]; Helen 
Davidson, Chinese Writer Faces Online Backlash Over Wuhan Lockdown Diary, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/10/chinese-writer-fang-fang-faces-
online-backlash-wuhan-lockdown-diary [https://perma.cc/MY22-HG7Q]. 
195 Jun Mai & Mimi Lau, Chinese Scholar Blames Xi Jinping, Communist Party 
for Not Controlling Coronavirus Outbreak, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 6, 
2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3049233/chinese-
scholar-blames-xi-jinping-communist-party-not  [https://perma.cc/T6MX-4LWA] 
(quoting He Weifang); Mimi Lau, Echo Xie & Guo Rui Coronavirus: Li 
Wenliang’s death prompts academics to challenge Beijing on freedom of speech, 
S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 12, 2020), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3050086/coronavirus-
hundreds-chinese-sign-petition-calling-freedom [https://perma.cc/CUW9-DPVJ]. 
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part pursuant to broad and vague rules that prohibit and punish 
spreading rumors.196  As illustrated by the taking down of state-linked 
People magazine’s WeChat-posted interview with Ai Fen, state 
control and party directives still impose serious—and, in recent years, 
tightening—limitations on the media, restricting their ability to report 
on emerging crises and governance failures.197 
At the same time, China’s information environment of 
controlled and censored institutional media and sometimes-rumor-
filled social media can lead audiences to infer that the real situation 
well may be more dire than what often-unforthcoming official and 
establishment sources reveal.  This is all the more likely to be the case 
in frightening and fast-moving crises such as COVID-19.198  Such 
public misimpression and mistrust pose additional problems for the 
regime’s capacity to respond effectively to COVID-19-like 
challenges.  This, in turn, suggests that the authorities could be better 
able to pursue their own goals in preventing, detecting, and 
containing infectious disease outbreaks and public health 
emergencies if new and old media faced lesser restrictions. 
 
196 See generally Rogier Creemers, Cyber China: Upgrading Propaganda, Public 
Opinion Work and Social Management for the Twenty-First Century, 26 J. 
CONTEMP. CHINA 85, 91–93 (2017) (detailing the development of policy against 
spreading rumors online that may cause “social panic”); Maria Repnikova, 
China’s Lessons for Fighting Fake News, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/06/chinas-lessons-for-fighting-fake-news/ 
[https://perma.cc/2Y6X-5CKK] (discussing widespread measures taken by the 
Chinese government to crack down on online rumors); Emergency Response 
Law, supra note 29, arts. 65, 68 (imposing sanctions, including criminal 
punishment, for spreading false information concerning emergency situation or 
response). 
197 Kuo, supra note 14; Huang, supra note 42.  See also 2020 World Press 
Freedom Index, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table 
[https://perma.cc/PT9K-NE95] (last visited Aug. 14, 2020) (ranking China 177 
out of 180 entities in press freedom); Susan L. Shirk, Changing Media, Changing 
China, in CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA 1, 2–3 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 2011) 
(noting that despite increased commercialization of the media in the 1990s, 
“China is nonetheless still a long way from having a free press”).  
198 Issaku Harada, Surge in Chinese Virus Cases Fuels Public Distrust of Official 
Data, NIKKEI: ASIAN REV. (Feb. 14, 2020, 2:05 AM), 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Surge-in-Chinese-virus-cases-fuels-
public-distrust-of-official-data [https://perma.cc/H7D4-VXK2]; Daniel Victor, 
Panic and Criticism Spread on Chinese Social Media Over Coronavirus, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/world/asia/china-
social-media-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/Q4Z8-WXMF].  
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Major changes on these fronts will be difficult to achieve 
absent more fundamental and wide-reaching reforms, such as robust 
protection for freedom of speech and the press, or tolerance for the 
development of a more autonomous civil society.  Tellingly, many 
months after the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, there still have 
been almost no public discussions or published investigations in 
China into the origins of the epidemic, despite serious public concern 
about such issues and the regime’s handling of it.199   
 Finally, reforms could make more permissible and promising 
lawsuits by injured or aggrieved citizens that could increase 
retrospective accountability for flawed government responses to 
crises akin to COVID-19 and, in turn, incentivize officials to avoid 
recurrence in future potential crises.  In the melamine-tainted milk 
scandal, the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake (when several 
thousand children died in shoddily constructed school buildings 
approved by corrupt or indolent officials), and other large-scale 
disasters, victims and their lawyers have sought remedies from 
China’s judiciary.  These efforts have included both administrative 
lawsuits against officials and government entities and mass tort 
claims against officials or private defendants in cases that have 
involved, and exposed, government failure.200   
 
199 Some overheated assessments outside China speculated that public concern 
and discontent with the initial handling of the outbreak and the lack of 
transparency could make COVID-19 the regime’s “Chernobyl moment.”  Gary 
Shih, In Coronavirus Outbreak, China’s Leaders Scramble to Avert a Chernobyl 
Moment, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2020, 7:01 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-coronavirus-outbreak-
chinas-leaders-scramble-to-avert-a-chernobyl-moment/2020/01/29/bc4eb52a-
4250-11ea-99c7-1dfd4241a2fe_story.html [https://perma.cc/RJ2B-HK3T]; 
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(Mar. 4, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/is-covid-19-chinas-chernobyl-
moment/ [https://perma.cc/LK9K-74CC].  For a more measured assessment of the 
limited negative impact, see Minxin Pei, How Has the Coronavirus Crisis 
Affected Xi’s Power: A Preliminary Assessment, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 
(June 1, 2020), https://www.prcleader.org/pei-1 [https://perma.cc/SKB9-UF7H].  
But see the sources cited in note 153. 
200 Andrew Jacobs & Edward Wong, China Reports Student Toll for Quake, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 7, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/world/asia/08china.html 
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When they go forward (and sometimes even when they do 
not), such lawsuits can serve a purpose that the regime should 
welcome as consistent with its interests in effective governance and 
its expressed preferences for rule by law.201  They can enlist harmed 
or at-risk citizens to expose malfeasance in governance, and thereby 
spotlight needs for corrective measures that can reduce the likelihood 
of public health and other emergencies, and the threats they can pose 
to the economy, social stability, and the regime’s popular legitimacy.   
Yet, here too, prospects for major change appear modest.  
Such legal claims sometimes will fail for any number of reasons, 
including courts’ refusal to adjudicate the cases on their own initiative 
or under directives or pressure from political authorities at various 
levels.  The melamine milk, Wenchuan earthquake, and kindred 
public health and safety crises have spawned lawsuits, but they rarely 
get very far in court.  Early attempts to bring COVID-19 suits seem 
very unlikely to fare better.202  State-brokered compensation schemes 
sometimes have followed for groups of victims, but, absent 
significant and effective reforms expanding court access and judicial 
remedies, potential plaintiffs often will be deterred by slim chances 
for success or concerns about retaliation by targeted officials.  Class 
action suits, a vibrant cadre of crusading mass tort lawyers, and 
doctrinally innovative pro-victim courts have played major roles in 
fostering legal means for promoting accountability for regulatory 
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https://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/uncategorized/tainted-milk-lawsuit-
rejected/3780/ [https://perma.cc/7U54-UEWQ]; Edward Wong, Milk Scandal in 
China Yields Cash for Parents, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2009), 
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failure—and, in turn—recurrence-reducing reforms in some 
countries, but such “bottom-up” forces for law-driven change have 
not been present in China, and they are not likely to emerge in the 
near future.203 
CONCLUSION: COVID-19 AS A CASE STUDY OF 
CHINA’S GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY STATE 
China’s response to the challenges of COVID-19 offers a case 
study of law, the regulatory state and governance in China.  The initial, 
troubled response to the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan 
improved upon the early handling of the SARS crisis in 2003, in part 
reflecting the partial success of legal and regulatory reforms adopted 
to implement the lessons of SARS.  At the same time, the damaging 
delays in reporting and responding to COVID-19 reflected not only 
shortcomings in those reforms but also, and more importantly, 
distinctive and enduring features of the system, including:  the 
coexistence of, and tensions between, kuai-based approaches that 
give power and responsibility to local-level governments, and tiao-
based approaches that assign key roles to centralized, functionally 
specialized bureaucracies; the perverse incentives local-level 
officials face to try to cover up potentially serious emerging problems, 
which ultimately can make the consequences far worse; the 
fragmentation of institutions that stems from officials’ strong 
identification with their particular units and the relative weakness of 
some vital systems (such as the national public health bureaucracy) 
and that results in collectively ambiguous rules emanating from 
multiple sources and daunting challenges of coordinating among 
siloed entities to achieve coherent government action (especially 
 
203 See generally Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, Weiquan (Rights Protection) 
Lawyering in an Authoritarian State: Building a Culture of Public-Interest 
Lawyering, 59 CHINA J. 111, 126 (2008) (noting the limited prospects for impact 
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as an instrument of top-down rule); The Future of Public Interest Litigation in 
China, CHINA FILE (Nov. 16, 2016), 
https://www.chinafile.com/environment/future-of-public-interest-litigation-china 
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where the necessary measures could imperil traditionally higher-
priority policy goals). 
After these initial shortcomings, China’s largely successful, 
centrally mandated efforts to contain the pandemic, and prevent its 
recurrence, also reflected defining and durable features of the Chinese 
systems of law, regulation, and governance.  The response relied 
significantly, but only partly, on law-based means.  It showed a highly 
capable, centralized and authoritarian party-state that could:  mobilize 
vast governmental and societal resources; overcome challenges of 
steering fragmented and sprawling institutions; deploy a repertoire 
that included high-profile directions from top-level leaders, new ad 
hoc government and party coordinating bodies, informal political 
exhortations, and a formidable array of long-standing low-tech and 
newer high-tech mechanisms for monitoring and controlling citizens’ 
actions; and operate free from much constraint by quasi-federalist 
powers of local governments, autonomy or privacy rights of 
individuals, or popular resistance and public protest. 
Finally, prospects for post-COVID reforms, too, illustrate 
characteristic features of Chinese law, regulation, and governance.  
Post-COVID measures are likely to follow a typical pattern of 
adopting legal reforms to address the perceived sources of past 
shortcomings, such as structural and procedural problems of 
regulation that seem to have led to an initial slow response and local-
level cover-up (in the case of the Wuhan outbreak), and tightening 
regulation of underlying sources of the problem (trade in wild animals, 
in the case of the novel coronavirus).  But such reform measures will 
face familiar and pervasive impediments: the compelling appeal and 
stubborn entrenchment of both the kuai and tiao approaches (despite 
their problematic interactions); the pervasive difficulty of 
implementing ambitious policies (especially where they target large-
scale, dispersed, and valued behavior); and a persisting reluctance to 
adopt more transformative laws or policies that would protect 
whistleblowers, allow freer traditional and new media, accept a 
public “right to know,” or permit accountability-promoting civil or 
administrative lawsuits by victims of regulatory failure. 
To acknowledge these limits to prospective legal reforms—
and to the roles of law in China’s response to crises and means for 
managing crises—is not, however, a counsel of despair.  Past legal 
reforms have achieved some success.  More reforms are likely in the 
aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis.  And, for good and for ill, the tools 
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of regulation and the roles of law in China have proved susceptible to 
significant, and sometimes relatively sudden and dramatic, change. 
